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I. Introduction 
"love cut off from power or justice is psuedo-love, power isolated from love 
and justice is inauthentic power of dominance, and justice is a meaningless 
facade of legalism split off from love and real power of being." 
MaryDaly2 
'1 have come to realize the importance of the experiential because without 
human experience we will never achieve a true form of equality. In order 
to understand equality, people must understand caring." 
Patricia Monture3 
*Richard F. Devlin, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Calgary 
I. Many friends and colleagues in Ireland, Canada and the United States have contributed, 
directly and indirectly, to this project. I want to particularly acknowledge Mary Joe Frug, 
Allan C. Hutchinson, Martha Minow, Mary Jane Mossman and Leon Trakman, all of whom 
cared enough to give me the courage to write this article. Special thanks to Marilee Matheson, 
Lynn Richards and Bernadette Romanowsky. My greatest debt, however, is to Alexandra 
Dobrowolsky, for it is she who made feminism an issue for me both personally and politically, 
and she has been involved at every level, intellectual, emotional, practical. I should add that 
some of those whom I criticize are also those from whom I have learned the most. 
2. Beyond God the Father ( I 973), at 217. 
3. "Kin-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah" (1986), 2 C.J.W.L. 159. 
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Law, is so far as it sanctions the coercive power of the state, enables 
people to do frightening - even deadly - things to each other. 
Contemporary jurisprudence, the explanatory and justificatory voice of 
legal practice, fails to interrogate law's interconnection with violence and 
death and therefore, by a sin of omission, legitimizes humankind's mutual 
inhumanity. The end result i·s jurisprudential tolerance of, and 
acquiescence in, societies underpinned by violence. By identifying the 
nexus between community (nomos) and death (thanatos), this, 
admittedly speculative,4 essay attempts to raise the possibility of a 
discourse, practice and society that can encourage, reflect and concretize 
opportunities for human interaction that go beyond violence. What 
follows, I hope, is an exercise in consciousness-raising.5 
The essay is to be published in two parts. Part A, "The Killing 
Fields .. . ", is a criticai' inquiry into the way in which the "disciplines" of 
law and legal theory rationalize violence. I begin my discussion with a 
Celtic triptych - a series of three narratives - that is designed to 
provide the reader with some background information in order that he or 
she may acquire a sense of the perspective and experiential context from 
which this essay emerges. 
Next, I briefly outline the central role which violence has played in 
structuring our received tradition of jurisprudential inquiry. I will argue 
_that, without exception, jurists of the western tradition have adopted the 
fatalistic premise that violence is inevitable, even necessary, in human 
interaction. Such essentialism constrains in a fundamental way the 
remainder of their work and, more often that not, imprisons their 
jurisprudential efforts in attempts to legitimize the violence of one interest 
group over all others. In short, traditional jurisprudence does not 
challenge violence, it spiritualizes it. 
4. Speculative thought has been a vital element of literary herstory; see, e.g., Dorothy Bryant, 
The Kin of Ata are Waiting for You (1971); Charolette Gilman, Herlani(l979); Marge 
Piercy, Woman On the Edge of Time (1981 ). Moreover, much feminist jurisprudence has been 
deliberately speculative in nature, see, e.g., Ruth Colker, "Consciousness and Love: Towards 
a Feminist Theological Dialogue" (1988) (unpublished manuscript); C. MacKinnon, 
"Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence" (1984), 8 
Signs 635 [hereinafter cited as "Feminist Jurisprudence"]; J. Rifkin, "Toward a Theory of Law 
and Patriarchy" (1980), 3 Harvard W.L.J. 83; D. Polan, "Towards a Theory of Law and 
Patriarchy" in D. Kairys, The Politics of Law 294 (1983); Ann Scales, "Toward a Feminist 
Jurisprudence" (1981), 56 Ind. L. J. 375; Fran Olsen, "The Family and The Market: A Study 
ofldeology and Legal Reform" (1983), 96 Harvard L. Rev. 1497, 1560-78; Christine Littleton, 
"Reconstructing Sexual Equality" (1987), 75 Cal. L. R. 1279 [hereinafter cited as 
"Reconstructing"]. 
5. On the centrality consciousness-raising as both methodology and praxis for feminism, see 
Catharine MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory" 
( 1982), 7 Signs 515 [hereinafter cited as "Agenda"]. 
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Next, I outline the fundamental connection between violence and the 
legal systems of contemporary western liberal democratic society. The 
purpose of this section is not to belittle the significant accomplishments 
that have been achieved by liberalism, but rather to demonstrate that we 
still have a great deal further to go. Our faith in the Rule of Law should 
not blind us to the inscription of violence within that very idea itself, at 
least as it is currently understood, or obscure from us the fact that ours 
may be a social "order ... made with knives",6 a society of "organized 
lovelessness".7 A brief conclusion summarizes the impasse in which 
modern law and theory find themselves. 
Part B of the essay (to be published in the next issue of this Journal), 
subtitled, "Feminism as Jurisgenerative Transformation, or, Resistance 
Through Parti�l Incorporation?"8 is a cautious constructive sequal to the 
critique of "The Killing Fields". After a short introduction, I outline the 
possibility for a legal system that might provide an opportunity to escape 
the deadening weight of acquiescence, and encourage greater 
consciousness of violence, and perhaps even its de-centering. I shall argue 
that traces of this counter-vision can be identified within feminism, and 
will suggest that one critical difference of a feminist jurisprudence is that 
it provides a unique opportunity to displace the thanatical impulse that 
underpins traditional "male-stream"9 legal theory. Insofar as feminism 
aspires "to question everything", 10 it focuses our attention on the 
relationship between law, violence and love, thereby providing what is, 
perhaps, a unique opportunity to create "a new jurisprudence, a new 
relation between life and law" .11 
In Part III of the sequel, through a discussion of pornography, I 
attempt to balance the theoretical potential of an emancipatory feminist 
jurisprudence against the practical everyday reality of violence against 
women. In Part IV, by relating theory to practice, I will suggest that law, 
as presently understood and practiced, while being a necessary part of the 
solution is also part of the problem. 
The final section of the paper will suggest that the tension between 
theory and practice, though depressing, need not be paralysing. 
6. Margaret Atwood, Surfacing ( 1972) at 215. 
7. Aldous Huxley, The Perenial Philosophy 93 (1944), cited in Ann Scales, "The Emergence 
of Feminist Jurisprudence" (1986), 95 Yale L. J. 1373, I 39 I. 
8. Forthcoming (1989), 12 Dal. L. J. 
9. Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction ( 1981) coins this phrase. 
JO. A. Rich, "Forward: On History, Illiteracy, Passivity, Violence and Women's Culture" in 
On lies, Secrets and Silence: Selected Prose (1966-1978), at 13 (1979) (hereinafter cited as 
"Lies"). See also Wishik, "To Question Everything" (1986), Berkeley Women's L. J. 64, who 
proposes that " ... (n)othing about existing law should constrain the construction of our 
visions" at 77. 
11. Catharine MacKinnon, "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 4 at 658. 
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Unidimensional solutions would obscure more than they reveal. I will 
suggest that the feminist resort to legal remedies must be extremely 
context-sensitive, necessitating a careful balancing of the realities and the 
potentials - both progressive and reactionary - but always inspired by 
the desire to transform law, not simply to rework it. The dilemma into 
which feminist practice leads us is, itself, an acute awareness of the 
difficulty of speaking against the rationalization of violence.12 
12. At the outset, I must admit that I have had strong reservations about even articulating the 
concerns raised in this paper. The reason for this reluctance is, what I understand to be, the 
integral connection between speech and power. Speech is more than simply voicing an 
opinion. Speaking is an exercise in power. But not everyone who speaks commands the same 
amount of power. More importantly, when some people speak, that act is so powerladen that 
it drowns out other voices. Speech can be the silencing of others. 
As of the time of writing, I am a white, male law professor at a relatively prestigious 
Canadian law school. This role, which continually threatens to annihilate the person, has been 
given (or has taken upon itself) a hierarchical social significance. Therefore, when I speak, 
people sometimes listen. My status reinforces my power. More significantly, my act of speaking 
and others' act of listening has a direct impact upon other persons. By monopolizing the 
channels of discourse and reception, my speech prevents others from speaking. Or, even if they 
do speak, they may not be heard because their speech does not carry the same authority as 
mine. My voice may be respected, their's may be devalued. If I say nothing, perhaps I will not 
clog the already limited paths of communication; and perhaps someone else will say something 
more important than what follows. 
Yet, at the same time, I feel that silence can be frighteningly loud . . and dangerous. 
Communication is an essential aspect of our social condition, a prerequisite for the advanced 
level of our society and for our mutual interdependence (Jurgen Habermas, Communication 
and the Evolution of Society ( 1979) ). Thus, while the dangers of despotic discourse are very 
real, communication is also an act of community, an act of civic responsibility. More 
specifically, when a person communicates there is a real possibility that she or he can consider 
the other person as a full person, someone worthy of respect whose viewpoint is legitimate to 
the extent that it does merit both listening to and response. Communication, as both listening 
and response, validates the integrity of the other. Indeed, feminist literary theorist, Julia 
Kristeva, suggests that communication is motivated by a desire to love and be loved. See 
Revolutions in Poetic Language ( 1974) (trans. Margaret Waller, 1984). Perhaps a 
communicative ethics will help lay the foundation of a feminist inspired ethics. 
Moreover, when people go public by communicating with one another, they reveal, either 
implicitly or explicitly, their own deepest secret fears and aspirations. The communicator then 
becomes vulnerable, an important first step towards solidarity . .. and perhaps equality. 
Understood in this admittedly benign light, communication avoids the insidious dynamic of 
clandestine sabotage by publicly articulating fears, concerns and hopes. 
I have said that my intention is to participate in a discourse, but of course this begs the very 
question of whether males and females share sufficient common experiences and common 
language to make real communication possible. If language is "man-made" (Dale Spender, 
Man Made Language (2nd ed.) (1980) ), if males monopolize the "socio-cultural means of 
interpretation and communication" (Nancy Fraser, "Toward a Discourse Ethic of Solidarity" 
(1986), 5 Praxis International 425), then it may well be that feminists and males cannot share 
a dialogic discourse for there is a lack of sufficient common ground, or women, as yet, have 
not had the opportunity to create the words. (See Mary Daly, The Wickedary (1988) ). 
For discourse to be possible there must exist an "interpretive" (S. Fish, ls There a Text in 
This Class: The Authority of Interpretive Communities ( 1980). In using Fish's term here it is 
Footnote 12 continued on page 347 
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II. A Celtic Triptych 
"To understand society deeply is always to see the settled from the angle of 
the unsettled. " 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger13 
I. Reviewing the Jurisprudential Point of View 
As I will argue in the next section of this essay, traditionally, 
jurisprudence has been written from the perspective of those who are 
situated in a position of privilege. Even the most cursory reflection on the 
leading figures of our jurisprudential heritage - Plato, Aquinas, Hobbes, 
Locke, Kant, Austin, Kelsen, Rawls and Dworkin 14 - suggests two 
important facts: first, that they are all men; and second, that despite their 
important differences, a biographical profile indicates a commonality of 
privileged social status. My purpose in raising these two issues is not to 
suggest some transhistorical conspiracy - for that would be indefensible 
- but rather to remind us of the Marxist aphorism that "social being 
determines consciousness", that our social status has an irrespressible 
impact upon our understanding of the world. 
In recent years, feminism has been the movement that has pursued the 
thesis of perspectivism most explicitly and relentlessly. As we shall see in 
Part II of this essay, a key theme of feminist analysis has been the 
ontological, epistemological and political significance of gender 
difference. Not only have feminists identified the inequality and power­
laden nature of relationships between men and women (patriarchy), they 
have also argued that the exclusion of women's perspectives from all 
aspects of social life has led to an impoverished and unidimensional 
interpretive structure (androcentrism). The cummulative impact of 
patriarchy and androcentrism on law has been what Martha Minow, in 
a related context, has described as "partial justice", that is, a conception 
of justice that is both incomplete and partisan. 15 Law and legal theory, 
incorporate, reflect and concretize particularized and existentially located 
viewpoints on the world, not the truth. 
Feminist political theorist, Nancy Hartsock, has also identified the 
interpretive signficance of socio-cultural location and, more importantly, 
has highlighted the progressive dynamic engendered by an awareness and 
mobilization of the power of "otherness". 
( 1) Material life ( class position in Marxist theory) not only structures but 
sets limits on the understanding of social relations. (2) If material life is 
structured in fundamentally opposing ways for two different groups, one 
13. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Social Theory ( 1987) at 65. 
14. See infra at Part III. 
15. "Partial Justice: Law and Minorities" (1988, unpublished manuscript). 
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can expect both that the vision of each will represent an inversion of the 
other and the vision of the ruling class will be partial and perverse. (3) The 
vision of the ruling class structures the material relations in which all 
parties are forced to participate, and therefore cannot be dismissed as 
simply false. ( 4) In consequence, the vision available to the oppressed 
,. group must be struggled for and represents an achievement that requires 
both science to see beneath the surface of the social relations in which all 
are forced to participate, and the education that can only grow from 
political struggle. ( 5) Because the understanding of the oppressed is an 
engaged vision, the adoption of a standpoint exposes the real relations 
among human beings as inhuman, points beyond the present, and carries 
a historical and liberatory role. 16 
For Hartsock and Minow, a view from the bottom, an interpretation 
from those who are disempowered, is a vital viewpoint for it identifies the 
nexus between knowledge and power and, even more importantly, the 
existence of subjugated knowledges that, resurrected, could help us make 
social interaction otherwise. 
This feminist espousal of otherness, difference and partiality, is of 
fundamental political and jurisprudential significance. It indicates, in a 
profound way, the centrality of factors - in this case, gender - which, 
within mainstream theory, were considered either as irrelevant and 
irrational or, even more repressively, as "non-questions".17 By 
destabilizing male-stream coherence and universality, by disinterring a 
perspective that has been buried by centuries of male-stream intellectual 
hegemony, feminism has dramatically opened up the parameters and 
potential of the jurisprudential conversation. In so doing, it has also 
unpacked a plethora of hitherto unforeseen problems. 
Moreover, in the last few years, feminists have become conscious that 
there are real dangers in what some describe as "dualistic thought". 18 By 
structuring their analysis around the dichotomies of women/men, 
feminism/masculinism, there is the risk of "false universalism"; that is, of 
buying into an assumption all women (or men) regardless of race, class, 
age, or national origins share a commonality that exists in contradistinc­
tion to men (or women). For some feminists, such a dichotomized 
universalism is totalistic, repressive and acontextual, ultimately no more 
than an inversion and reproduction of male-stream analysis. For these 
(postmodern) feminists, though gender is important, so also are many 
other factors to one's experience, interpretation and existence in the 
16. Money, Sex and Power: Towards a Feminist Historical Materialism ( 1983) at 118. 
17. See Jill McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile" in Feminism in Canada, 
supra note 12 at 28. 
18. See generally, Sondra Farganis, The Social Reconstruction of the Feminine Character 
( 1986), Chapter 8 and 9. 
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world. 19 This polyvocal or multiplicitous feminist approach recognizes 
the importance of gender, but refuses to prioritize it as the explanatory 
factor of social interaction, for that would only be to reinforce the 
subordination of otherness. Feminism, in this view, seeks to create 
interpretive space so that a variety of different voices - those that relate 
to issues of class, race, sexual orientation, religion, handicap, ethnicity 
and national origins, as well as gender - can actively participate in the 
jurisprudential conversation. 
Over the last couple of years I have learned a great deal from 
feminism, methodologically, critically and substantively. Given the 
importance which feminism attaches to located experience, as well as its 
emphasis upon the constitutive relationship between the personal, the 
political and the juridical, I want to offer an/ other contribution to the 
now expanded jurisprudential conversation, a perspective that emerges 
from my own experiental context. This interpretation is different from 
most of the male-stream and feminist analyses of law and is certainly 
partial . . .  but, as will become clear, that alone does not make it any less 
valid. It is simply a different reality. 
However, an awareness of different realities should not be 
misunderstood as an acceptance of relativism. A recognition of difference 
is not indifferent to domination. A central purpose of this essay is to 
challenge at its core the dominant (male-stream) interpretation of the 
reality of law - that law is "an unqualified human good"20 - and, in 
so doing, to posit the need for a reconstitution of modern law. The essay 
is also a plea to those who are enthusiastic about using law to solve 
(patriarchal) social practices to try to "apprehend the reality of the 
other",21 to consider those who will be on the receiving end of such 
strategies. It is a petition to remember that contemporary law is about the 
enforcement of domination, that it creates its own subordination, and it 
requests, if possible, care about those others while caring for their own 
needs. From my perspective, modern law does not deviate from 
domination, it merely distances us from its victims. 
19. See eg, Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice Post Structuralist Theory (1987); Jane Flax, 
"Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory" (1987), 12 Signs 621; Nancy 
Fraser, Linda Nicholson, "Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter Between 
Feminism and Post-modernism", in A. Cohen and M. Descal, (eds) The Institution of 
Philosophy. A Discipline in Crisis ( 1988); Martha Minow, "Partial Justice: Law and 
Minorities" (unpublished manuscript); "Justice Engendered" [hereinafter Engendered] (1987), 
l O l Harvard L. R. l O; Seyla Ben ha bib, Drucilla Cornell, Feminism as Critique ( 1987). 
20. See eg, sources as diverse as E.P. Thompson Whigs and Hunters ( 1975) at 266; and 
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire ( 1986). 
21. Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics (1984). I will return to this point 
in Part II, B, 2, b, iii. 
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In keeping with these themes of contextualism and perspectivism, let 
<-· me say that I comprehend modern law through the prism of my 
experiences in British-occupied Northern Ireland.22 In order to provide an 
indication of the context . from which I emerge, to suggest that this 
c viewpoint from the bottom is not unique, and to de-centre the 
authoritarianism latent in any act of authorship, in the remainder of this 
section I want to bring to the reader's attention three "scenes", as related 
by others, of experiences with, and interpretations of, law. What follows 
is a far cry from the stuff from which jurisprudence is usually made. 
However, the triptych does, I hope, exemplify the experiential depth of 
the critique, portray the authenticity of the perspective, and encourage a 
recognition of the necessity of juridical reconstruction as part of the 
programme for any p�ogressive social movement. 
2. Panel One: A View From the Bottom 
No Time For Love 
They call it the law: we call it apartheid, internment, conscription, 
partition and silence. 
It's the law that they make to keep you and me where they think we 
belong. 
They hide behind steel and bullet-proof glass, machine guns and spies, 
And they tell us who suffer the tear gas and the torture that we're in the 
wrong. 
Chorus 
No time for love if they come in the morning, 
No time to show tears or for fears in the morning, 
No time for goodbye, no time to ask why, 
And the sound of the siren's the cry of the morning. 
They suffered the torture, they rotted in cells, went crazy, wrote letters 
and died. 
The limits of pain they endured, but the loneliness got them instead 
And the courts gave them justice as justice is given by well-mannered 
thugs. 
22. I suspect that many readers will respond that I am generalizing what is an exceptional 
instance of law into a totalistic analysis. That, however, would be to misunderstand what I 
have been trying to get at in the last couple of pages of text. The Irish context is helpful in that 
it does provide an exemplary moment of the nexus between law and domination. However, 
there are people at the bottom in every society, and I believe parallels can be drawn between 
their experiences and those that are recounted in the following triptych. The point is that their 
perspectives do not, usually, make it into the pages of North American law journals because 
they have been dispossessed . . .  interpretively, politically and jurisprudentially. Domination 
and subordination are not just quantative they are also qualitative. 
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Sometimes they fought for the will to survive, but more times they just 
wished they were dead. 
Chorus 
They took away young Francis Hughes and his cousin Tom Mcllwee as 
well. 
They came for Patsy O'Hara and Bobby Sands and some of his friends. 
In Boston, Chicago, Saigon, Santiago, Warsaw and Belfast 
And the places that never make headlines, the list never ends. 
Chorus 
The boys in blue are only a few of the everyday cops on the beat, 
The C.I.C., Branchmen, the Blacks and the Gilmores do their jobs well; 
Behind them the men who tap phones, take photos, programme 
computers and files 
And the man who tells them when to come and take you to your cell. 
Chorus 
Come all you people who give to your sisters and brothers the will to 
fight on, 
They say you can get used to a war, that doesn't mean that the war isn't 
on. 
The fish need the sea to survive just like your people need you 
And the death squad can only get through to them if first they can get 
through to you. 
Chorus 
Yes the sound of the siren's the cry of the morning, 
Oh the sound of the siren's the cry of the morning. 
3. Panel Two: An Arrest and Interrogation 
Rosemary Meenan, Derry. Age: 21  years 
Height: 5 ft. Weight: 7 st 8 lbs. 
Occupation: Factory worker. Single status. 
Jack Warshaw23 
I, Rosemary Meenan, was arrested on the 28th of July 1976 at 
5:30 a.m. from my home in Lisfannon Park. I was arrested by British 
soldiers accompanied by a Military Police woman and taken to Strand 
Road Police Barracks, which is also the headquarters of British 
Military Police. I was photographed and then put into a small room. 
23. Christy Moore Songbook (1984), 86-87. 
C 
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During the time I was there I was subjected to verbal abuse by Army 
Personnel and at one stage the chair was kicked from under me. I was 
handed over to the Royal Ulster Constabulary at 8 p.m. I was formally 
arrested under Section 12  of the Emergency Provisions Act. I was 
escorted to a cell by a police woman and left there. The cell was dirty; 
there was urine on the floor and it contained no furniture other than 
a wooden plank or bench. There was a small window in the top wall. 
I was left there for some time; I can't say exactly how long, as I did 
not have a watch, and then I was taken upstairs by a police woman. 
I was taken into a small office on the first floor. It contained a desk 
and a small table and three chairs. Three men in plain clothes came 
into the room. One sat facing me and two others stood behind me. The 
police woman sat �n a chair in the corner. One of the men asked me 
if I knew why I was there. I did not answer. They then said that they 
had signed statements from people in the Bogside, who wanted me off 
the streets. They also said that . . . . . . . . . . . . . had been arrested and 
had signed a statement that he and I had attempted to murder a 
soldier. They said that we were going to a special court in the morning. 
I replied that I had nothing to say, and asked to see my solicitor. The 
two plain clothes men behind, then pulled me by the hair forcing my 
head back. The man who had been questioning me, got up and spat 
on my face. I wiped my face and asked again for a solicitor. I 
requested a solicitor during every period of interrogation for the seven 
days I was in custody but my request was always refused. I was again 
questioned about attempted murder and the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) and I was asked to sign a statement 
admitting the attempted murder of a soldier. I refused to sign. The two 
plain clothes men went out, and two others came in. They questioned 
me about IRA activity in the Bogside and the alleged charge. One of 
them kicked me off the chair and I fell into the corner. The man who 
was questioning me got up and put his foot on my stomach. He asked 
me to sign a statement. I refused. One of the men went out and came 
back with a statement. They showed me the bottom half and it alleged 
that I was a member of Cumann na mBan. It was signed by 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  I requested to see the entire statement but they said it 
contained . . . . . . . . . . . . .  address, and that I could not see it. 
I was then taken upstairs and down a long corridor into a large 
room with a window covered by a venetian blind. I was not to see 
daylight for the entire seven days. The two men, whom I now knew 
to be Special Branch Officers, were with me, also a police woman. 
They were joined by a big heavy man whom I had not seen before. He 
pulled my coat off told me to run around the room as if I had a gun 
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under my coat. I refused. He pulled me by the hair again and then ran 
me around the room. Then they told me to stand facing the wall but 
I refused so they pulled me by the hair and banged by head on the 
wall. They asked me again to sign an incriminating statement. The 
men then left the room and the police woman offered me a cup of tea. 
She said that she would not take that sort of treatment from anyone 
and advised me to tell them what they wanted to know. The two 
branch men came back into the room and the interrogation resumed. 
Their language was vulgar and abusive. I was taken back to my cell 
and I saw by their watches that it was 2:00 a.m.; seventeen hours since 
my interrogation had begun. There was no mattress in my cell, so I lay 
on the board. Although I was exhausted, I was unable to sleep because 
of the cold air in the cell. About an hour later a Special Branch man 
came in with a hankie done by . . . . . .. . . . . . .  They said that I would 
soon be doing these in jail. They went out again but kept coming back 
and kicking the cell door. I didn't sleep that night. 
The next morning at 8:30 a.m. they took me up the corridor and I 
saw my mother hand a flask to a policeman. I was returned to the cell 
and the flask and toast were given to me. This was the first food I had 
eaten since I was arrested. I was not to eat again for two days, as I 
refused to take the food the police offered me, fearing that it might be 
tampered with, and they refused to give me the food my mother left 
for me. I was taken to the same office for interrogation during the next 
six days, for periods of six to twelve hours. I was finger printed and 
during this time I was struck on the mouth by a Special Branch Man. 
The interrogation took the form of question, threat and physical abuse, 
such as face slapping, hair pulling and standing for long periods with 
my hands above my head. I was continually thumped under the arm, 
and on the third day my arm was stiff and very painful. I was given 
the impression that if I signed the statement all this would stop. 
On the third day of my detention I was informed that an interim 
custody order had been authorised so that I could be detained for a 
further four days. I was interrogated for periods of two hours both 
morning and afternoon. Both the tone and manner of the 
interrogations was menacing and abusive. During this period one of 
the Branch men left the room and came back carrying a white folded 
cloth. He spread it out on the floor of the room and told me to sit on 
it. I refused. The other two branchmen pulled me down by the wrists 
and held me there whilst the other man put a pen in my hand and told 
me to write my name on the sheet. When I refused he slapped me 
about the face and began shouting at me using vulgar language. Later 
in the day I had my first visitor, a local priest, Father . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,
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I told him what was happening, but asked him not to tell my mother. 
On the fourth day I was interrogated during the morning but left in my 
cell in the afternoon. This was the first break in daytime interrogation 
I had had in four days. My mother visited me at 5:00 p.m. and brought 
me food. The visit lasted five minutes and I asked my mother to get 
me a solicitor. She told me that my solicitor had been refused entry. 
After the visit I was taken upstairs for interrogation. My arm was very 
stiff and painful and my interrogators kept asking me to raise it. I 
could not do so. They then took me to a room and a man there 
identified himself as a Police doctor. He asked me if I would be 
examined but I refused. He wrote down my complaints and asked me 
to sign the paper. I refused as I was afraid to incriminate myself. I was 
taken back to my c�ll at 10:00 p.m. Despite the pain I slept. 
On the fifth day I was allowed food left by my mother. I still had 
no mattress on my bed nor had I been allowed to wash. During this 
day the interrogation took a different form. I was asked personal and 
embarrassing questions; Are you a virgin? Do you sleep with the 
Provos? They then threatened to rape me and dump me in a back lane. 
One of the Branch men came over to me and ran his hands over my 
person. He kept breathing heavily in my face. The other men, there 
were three in all, said dirty things about my family and my mother. At 
5:00 a.m. I had a visit from my mother. I told her that I had no 
mattress in my cell and that my back was sore. A plain clothes man 
present during the visit denied abusing me. When I was taken back to 
my cell there was a mattress there but the food my mother had given 
me was taken from me. 
The next morning I was taken upstairs. I had not been given 
anything to eat but allowed to throw water on my face. This time the 
interrogation took the form of a persuasion. The Branch Man said that 
if I signed a statement admitting membership of the PIRA they would 
drop the attempted murder charge. They said I would only get two 
years for membership, and that I'd be out in a year. I asked again for 
my solicitor but was refused. When the two Branch men were 
bringing me down the stairs one turned off the lights and the other 
tried to push me down the stairs. I managed to grab the rail. Later on 
that night my mother visited me for twenty minutes. During the visit 
I took a pain in my side. I was interrogated after the visit, but this time 
there was no abuse. At nine o'clock my family doctor, Dr . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . visited me. He diagnosed an infection of my kidney, 
and muscular swelling to my arm. He asked if the cell was cold. I was 
taken back to my cell and a uniformed policeman told me that I was 
being released. A few minutes later two Branch men came in and told 
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me that I was being re-arrested. I was released thirty minutes later. It 
was ten thirty p.m. 
Rosemary Meenan24 
4. Panel Three: Law and Death 
The three principal cases covered by my investigation were as follows. 
On 1 1  November 1982 three men were shot dead by members of a 
special Royal Ulster Constabulary anti-terrorist unit in Tullygalley 
East Road, just outside Lurgan. The men were Eugene Toman, Sean 
Burns and Gervaise McKerr. They were all unarmed. 
Less than two weeks later, on 24 November 1982, two youths were 
shot, one being killed and the other seriously wounded, by members 
of the same anti-terrorist unit, in a hayshed in Ballyneery Road North, 
also just outside Lurgan. The dead youth was Michael Justin Tighe, 
who was 1 7  years old, and his companion was Martin McCauley, who 
was 19. Three old pre-war rifles were recovered from the hayshed, but 
no ammunition was found. 
Less than three weeks after that, on 12  December 1982, two more 
men were shot dead, yet again by a member of the same special unit, 
this time in Mullacreavie Park, in Armagh City. They were Seamus 
Grew and Roddy Carroll. Neither of them was armed. 
All these shootings were investigated by other members of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, and files were sent to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, Sir Barry Shaw. The first 
prosecution to come before the courts related to the last of the three 
incidents, and was that of Constable John Robinson. He appeared 
before Mr. Justice McDermott on 3 April 1984, and was acquitted of 
the murder of Seamus Grew. Neither he nor any other police officer 
has ever been charged with the murder of Roddy Carroll, who was in 
the same car as Grew when they were shot. During the trial Constable 
Robinson gave evidence in his own defence, and it emerged publicly 
for the first time that the two men had been shot not, as claimed, at a 
random police road check, but following a long surveillance operation 
that had taken RUC officers into the Republic of Ireland and back 
again. Robinson, it was disclosed, was not an ordinary policeman as 
had been said, but a member of a highly trained special police squad, 
24. Fr. Denis Faul and Fr. Raymond Murray, The Cast/ereugh File: A/legations of RUC 
Brutality 1976-1977 (Dungannon, 1978) 91-93. I should add that I have attempted to be very 
careful in selecting this piece of testimony. Many other reports by women place more emphasis 
on the prevalence of sexual abuse in the interrogation process. However, because of my 
concern about the reproduction of "pornographic vignettes" (a phrase coined by Carol Smart) 
I thought it preferable not to report such discussions in this forum. For a feminist critique of 
pornography, see Part II C of this essay. 
.., 
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and the deaths of Grew and Carroll had come at the end of a planned 
operation involving that special squad. During the trial Constable 
Robinson told a story that made international headlines: he told the 
court that he had been instructed by senior police officers to tell lies on 
his official statements in order to protect the nature of that special 
operation. It became clear that investigating CID officers, the Director 
of Public Prosecutions, and finally the courts themselves, had all been 
quite deliberately misled in order to protect police procedures and 
systems. The revelations created a public outcry .. . 
Within a few days of my commencing the investigation, the trial of 
three more policemen on murder charges made for more international 
headlines. Sergeant Montgomery and Constables Brannigan and 
Robinson ( not the s,ame officer as in the Grew and Carroll shootings) 
were acquitted of the murder of Eugene Toman at a supposed road 
block in Tullygally East Road, Lurgan. The trial judge, Lord Justice 
Gibson, recognized the unusual nature of the case and commented 
about seriously incorrect evidence given to a court at a preliminary 
hearing of the charges. He then went on, in acquitting the officers of 
murder, to praise them for bringing the deceased men, Toman, Burns 
and McKerr, to 'the final court of justice'. His remarks created 
unprecedented uproar. They appeared to remove all doubt: there 
existed, it seemed, a judicially endorsed 'shoot-to-kill' policy in the 
Province. The judge's reference to .the deaths of Burns and McKerr, 
whom none of the officers had been charged with unlawfully killing, 
was particularly unfortunate. Uncommitted observers, as well as 
nationalists, could see no reason why the judge should be so 
enthusiastic about the deaths of three unarmed men at the hands of the 
police. Such was the widespread international condemnation of his 
remarks that he quickly made a prepared (and very unusual) public 
statement from the Bench in which he clarified his views by 
emphatically repudiating the idea that he approved for a shoot-to-kill 
policy on the part of the police. It was too late for that: the damage 
was done, and no denial was every going to change the general public 
belief among Catholics and many others in the Province, as well as the 
mainland and the Republic of Ireland, that some members of the RUC 
were out of control and had a free rein to kill whomsoever they 
suspected of involvement in unlawful republicanism. Lord Justice 
Gibson became a marked man, and he and his wife were killed in a 
border car bomb explosion in April 1987 .. . 
Even though the six deaths had occurred over a five-week period in 
the same relatively small area of Northern Ireland, and involved in 
each case officers from the same specialist squad, no co-ordinated 
investigation had ever been attempted . . .  
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We started with the investigation into the deaths of Toman, Burns 
and McKerr in Tullygally East Road, Lurgan. The official version of 
the events had been that a police officer on foot, accompanied by a 
colleague, had routinely attempted to stop a Ford Escort car by the 
traditional method of standing in the road and signalling with his torch 
for it to stop. The driver, it was said, stopped momentarily, then 
accelerated past the policeman, striking him and causing him to jump 
out of the way. Other policemen in a patrol car, parked by chance 
nearby, had witnessed the incident and had moved off to follow the 
car. The policemen in the car said they believed they were being fired 
at, and opened return fire. The Ford Escort left the road; the three men 
in it were all found to have died instananeously from gunshot wounds. 
The truth was quite different. We discovered that the three men had 
been under surveillance for many hours, and that the police plan had 
been to intercept them at a different place altogether. No serious 
attempt to attract the attention of the driver was ever made, and no 
policeman was struck by the car. The three officers in the police car 
were waiting, and they fired 108 bullets from a Sterling sub-machine 
gun, Ruger rifles and a handgun during a pursuit that extended over 
500 yards. All the men died instantly; none was armed. I was 
astonished to learn that all the policemen involved had been instructed 
to leave the scene immediately, with their car and their weapons, and 
return to their base for a de-briefing by senior Special Branch officers. 
Detective officers were denied access for many days to them and to 
forensic examination of their car, clothes, hands and weapons. The 
same CID officers were, on the night of the killings, provided with 
incorrect information about where the shootings had commenced, and 
some forensic examination of the scene was conducted in the wrong 
place. Many cartridge cases were never found, and some wholly 
unconvincing explanations were given for their removal. One of these 
was that a Catholic priest who came unannounced to perform the last 
rites on the deceased must have swept the cases away, possibly 
accidentally in the hem of his cassock. 
My conclusion in relation to the missing cartridge cases was that as 
many as twenty were deliberately removed from the scene. I could 
only presume that this was in order to mislead the forensic scientists 
and to hide the true nature and extent of the shooting . . .  
In the meantime we worked hard at finding the truth of the shooting 
death of the unarmed Roddy Carroll and Seamus Grew in Armagh 
City on 12  December 1982. After that shooting a public statement had 
been issued by the police saying that the men were shot after breaking 
through a random police road block and injuring a policeman. None 
" 
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of this was true. At the trial of Constable Robinson for the murder of 
Grew he gave evidence, on oath, in his own defence, in which he said 
that after the shooting he was taken quickly from the scene before the 
CID could interview him, together with his weapon, uniform and 
police car. He said he was told to tell lies to protect an informant 
source. He was instructed to tell a story that made it appear that the 
entire episode had been the result of a misunderstanding. My team 
either discovered or confirmed for me that the deaths of Grew and 
Carroll had, like the other shootings, come at the end of a long 
surveillance operation that had involved RUC officers making 
journeys into the Republic of Ireland. Grew and Carroll had been 
followed for days but had managed to avoid a joint police/ Army road 
block after they drove back over the border into Northern Ireland. In 
an accidental collision between an undercover Army car and a police 
car a policeman had hurt his leg. We found that during the resulting 
confusion the suspects' Allegro car had driven past the accident 
undetected, followed by an RUC Special Branch Inspector who had 
been on their trail in the Province and in the Republic of Ireland. He 
saw the shambles at the side of the road, realized that Grew and 
Carroll had driven past unseen, and panicked. He picked up an armed 
RUC officer - Constable Robinson - and pursued the car 
containing Grew and Carroll. On the outskirts of the staunchly 
Catholic Mullacreavie Park housing estate in Armagh, the undercover 
police car pulled ahead of the suspects' car and Constable Robinson 
got out. He emptied his revolver into Grew and Carroll, reloaded and 
fired more shots. Both men died instantly. The Special Branch 
Inspector, who had had the opportunity to see everything and knew 
the truth, drove off, and his evidence was kept secret from the CID 
investigating the deaths and from the Director of Public Prosecutions 
and the courts. Records were altered to hide the use of undercover cars 
in that part of Northern Ireland . . .  
These were men whom the Special Branch strongly believed to be 
associates of the much-wanted alleged terrorist murderer Dominic 
McGlinchey. The complex operation, the surveillance, the unautho­
rized journeys by police officers into the Irish Republic, and finally the 
shootings were all part of a plan to detain McGlinchey. He had not, 
however, been seen by any policemen that day despite the long 
periods of surveillance, and it was never established - certainly not 
by me - that Seamus Grew and Roddy Carroll had been in his 
company . . .  
As the months of 1984 went by I realized the power of the RUC 
Special Branch. . . A clear message emerged: that Special Branch 
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officers planned, directed and effectively controlled the official 
accounts given in the two incidents we had so far addressed. The 
Special Branch targeted the suspected terrorist, they briefed the 
officers, and after the shootings they removed the men, cars and guns 
for a private de-briefing before the CID officers were allowed any 
access to these crucial matters. They provided the cover stories, and 
they decided at what point the CID were to be allowed to commence 
the official investigation of what had occurred. The Special Branch 
interpreted the information and decided what was, or was not, 
evidence; they attached the labels - whether a man was 'wanted' for 
an offence, for instance, or whether he was an 'on-the run terrorist' . . .  
The dead men were regarded as nothing but determined and 
ruthless terrorists who would have killed them had they not been 
killed first: men who were born to die violently in one way or 
another . . .  
[The third incident related to the death of] Michael Justin Tighe, at 
the Hayshed in November 1982. The Hayshed was a ramshackle, 
breeze-block and corrugated iron building owned by Kitty Kearns, the 
elderly widow of an old-time Republican who had died some years 
before. She had been away from home staying with friends at the time 
of the shooting. The farmhouse and barn lie close to a housing estate 
on the outskirts of Lurgan occupied by people of resolutely nationalist 
inclinations. The security forces knew that the barn had been the 
storage point for explosives used to kill three policemen six weeks 
earlier, and that the explosives had been removed undetected while the 
barn was supposedly under police surveillance . . .  
The search for information showed us that Tighe had no security 
record or criminal convictions. He was a fresh-faced young seventeen­
year-old, and his death had been a bewildering tragedy for his parents. 
We had spoken to them at length. They told us that Michael had never 
shown the slightest interest in political or terrorist activity. He lived at 
home quietly and was a good and considerate son who had a number 
of friends of the same age, including Martin McCauley, who was then 
nineteen. McCauley's name had been mentioned by an informant in 
connection with the Kinnego explosion. Tighe, on the other hand, had 
no record whatsoever. Tighe was a lad of simple needs who was happy 
and contented to remain in and around his home. Mr. and Mrs. Tighe 
could not accept that their son had been shot dead for any valid 
reason. They will always believe that he strayed innocently into an 
ambush intended for anyone who entered that staked-out barn, and 
that he was not given the opportunity to come out before being shot. . .  
.. 
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Until the trial was over it was not possible for me to answer [all the] 
questions, but I did know that the only reference to Tighe I saw in 
official records was dated after his death, and associated him 
posthumously with IRA activity because he had been shot dead by an 
anti-terrorist squad. The implication was that there could be no 
innocent reason for any youth to be in that barn on Ballyneery Road 
North: its association with a Republican sympathizer owner, its recent 
use for explosive storage and its proximity to a Catholic housing estate 
seemed to confirm beyond question that Tighe must have been there 
in the capacity of an IRA member. . .  
McCauley [the other youth] appeared before Mr. Justice Kelly 
charged with possessing the three old rifles that were found in the 
barn, without amll?unition, after he and Tighe had been shot. The 
account first given by the police officers stated that they had been on 
routine patrol when one of them had seen a man with a gun move 
from near the cottage into the Ha yshed. The police officer ran to the 
Hayshed and from outside heard the cocking sound of a rifle 
mechanism and muffled voices. A sergeant shouted 'Police! Throw out 
your weapons!' There was silence. He repeated the warning using the 
same words, but there was still no reply. Through a space in the 
makeshift door he saw McCauley pointing a rifle at a constable. The 
sergeant opened fire with an initial 14-round burst at McCauley and 
the constable fired a further three rounds. Within a few seconds the 
constable saw Tighe, also pointing a rifle, and he and another 
constable opened fire on him. Tighe dropped out of sight behind the 
bales of hay. A further volley of shots was then fired at McCauley, 
who had reappeared, still with the rifle, and then again at Tighe, who 
had also reappeared. McCauley was dragged out barely alive. 
(The author then outlines at length his understanding of the events and 
continued . . .  ]
As an individual, I also passionately believe that if a police force of the 
United Kingdom could, in cold blood, kill a seventeen-year-old youth with 
no terrorist or criminal convictions, and then plot to hide the evidence from 
a senior policeman deputed to investigate it, then the shame belonged to us 
all. This is the act of a Central American assassination squad - truly of a 
police force out of control. The cover stories, the lies, the obstruction were 
insignificant when placed alongside possible State murder . . .  
I reflected on the nature of the deaths I was investigating. They had a 
common feature: each left a strong suspicion that a type of pre-planned police 
ambush had occurred, and that someone had led these men to their deaths . . .  
. . .I wished that a letter be put on his file stating that after the most careful 
re-investigation I believed I could present a great deal of extra evidence, 
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including independent forensic findings, that would indicate that the five men 
shot dead in their cars were unlawfully killed by members of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary . . .  
It cannot be disputed that in a five-week period in the mid-winter of 1982 
six men were shot dead by a specialist squad of police officers in Northern 
Ireland. The circumstances of those shootings pointed to a police inclination, 
if not a policy, to shoot suspects dead without warning rather than to arrest 
them . . .  
I was no doubt seen [by the local police] as a mainland careerist who did 
not comprehend their world, and an important part of the RUC set out to 
make me understand that in Northern Ireland the survival and strength of the 
police is paramount. If the police fail, then government fails. There was 
nothing in their attitude towards me or my team that was personal; I doubt 
if it would have mattered who we were. It was a demonstration to us that life 
in the Province will - indeed, must - go on in its time-honoured way . . .  
John Stalker 
Former Deputy Constable of the Greater Manchester Police25 
III. Jurisprudential Occlusion: 
Rediscovering the Essentialism of Mainstream Jurisprudence 
" . . .  only a conception of law which is concerned with social reality and 
human experience can have philosophical meaning." 
C.J. Friedrich26 
"So long as we traffic in the ruling dogmas of society our doubts are kept 
to a minimum." 
Roberto Mangabeira U nger27 
1 .  The Assumption Stated 
Jurisprudence, like history, is written by the victors; it is structured by a 
view from the top down, rather than from the bottom up.28 Not 
surprisingly, the critiques emerging from, or inspired by, traditional 
jurisprudence have been partial rather than fundamental, reformist rather 
than transgressive, conceptual rather than experiential. 
For example, traditionally, analyses of the history of mainstream legal 
thought have been organized around the tensions between naturalism and 
positivism, reason and will, utilitarianism and deontology. Current 
jurisprudential debates manifest similarly unsituated and decontextual-
25. Stalker ( 1988) at 12-13, 38-41, 43, 52-53, 56, 59, 61-63, 67, 72, 92, 253, 262. 
26. Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective 149 ( 1963). 
27. False Necessity 19 ( 1987). 
28. For a brief overview of the social status of the leading lights of our received jurisprudential 
tradition, see Clarence Morris, Great Legal Philosophers ( 1 959). For an important discussion 
of the value of the viewpoint of the "other" see e.g. Mari Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom, 
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations" ( 1987), 22 Har. C.L.C.R.L.R. 323. 
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ized preoccupations. Law and economics strives to provide efficient 
accounts of the operation of law, both descriptively and normatively; 
deontological liberals advocate that the good society prioritizes the right 
over the good; civic republicans prioritize their visions of communal good 
over individual rights; interpretivists, regardless of their political stripes, 
pursue normative rationalization through hermeneutic analogies; and 
critical theorists argue that all of the foregoing are misconceived because, 
philosophically, such understandings are anachronistic for the post­
modern condition. 
However, despite these differences, differences which are clearly 
important, all of the above share a common viewpoint, their perspective 
is from the top of the pyramid, not the bottom. What I want to suggest 
is that if we start at the other end - at the bottom - then one's 
experiences and presuppositions, always interconnected, may be 
otherwise, with the consequence that the issues of concern will be very 
different. Put another way, because these academic's experience of law is 
subjective, it is partial, excluding the experience of others, particularly 
those who are at the receiving end of law, those who are, as I claim, "the 
victims of law". Their viewpoint may well encompass concerns not 
usually considered by the dominant traditions. 
The claim that I want to defend in this part of the paper is that 
underlying all their differences, our jurisprudential forefathers shared a 
common assumption: that violence is real law's determinative and 
distinguishing characteristic. Where they differ is in their relative 
explicitness with regard to the assumption, or in the justification of it. 
None have ever challenged the assumption itself. 
2. Tracking The Assumption 
In this section I want to briefly etch a pattern, one that provides an 
outline of the reluctance, or willingness, of jurists to recognize the 
interconnection between law and power, with particular emphasis on the 
clarity of their acknowledgement of the violence in law. My aim is to 
highlight how all of the jurists who, collectively, comprise our received 
tradition of jurisprudence implicitly or explicitly recognize that law is 
vital to bolster domination and to reinforce subordination. This is what 
I mean by a view from the bottom. 
We can begin our inquiry with the Ancient Greeks. Plato has long 
been recognized to be one of the founding fathers not only of 
jurisprudence, but also of philosophy and social and political theory.29 
29. One commentator rapturizes thus: "In the philosophy of Plato, Greek thought reached its 
culmination. He stands as the aristocrat among the philosophers of ancient days, an elect spirit 
of surpassing greatness." F. Berolzheimer, The World's Legal Philosophers 60 (1929). 
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His reflections on law can, roughly, be separated into two relatively 
distinct phases, the idealist and the practical, a dichotomy that, I would 
suggest, reflects his maturing political pragmatism. In the Republic and 
the Statesman, Plato indulged, at length, in his celebrated conception of 
law as the pronouncements of a philosopher king who could access 
justice through reflection, although admittedly, it would be impossible for 
him to communicate his reasons to lesser mortals. This has been the 
predominant focus of jurists who have reflected on Plato. 
However, an older Plato, chastened by the contemporary adventures 
of his city state, recognized the futility of such a vision of the ideal city, 
and advocated in its place a more practical polity, with a correspondingly 
more immediate conception of law. In The Laws, the later Plato argues 
that law must play a pivotal role in the structuring of the polity. For him, 
law is functional, its purpose is to make citizens virtuous, and this, in turn, 
will be for the common good of the whole community. 
At first blush, such a virtuous desideratum for law seems commend­
able. When, however, we proceed to unpack Plato's conception of the 
"virtuous society" the attractiveness of the aspiration begins to falter. As 
R.F. Stalley carefully argues, within The Laws there is a sleight of hand 
that merges the "virtuous society" with a predisposition for "conformity 
with social norms".30 This conflation of "virtue" with "conformity", 
raises critical concerns about Platonic conservatism, and asks why should 
these particular norms be preserved, and to whose benefit do they 
gravitate? 
More directly relevant for my purposes, however, is the role that law 
is to play in the virtuous polity. Although Plato makes much of the 
connectio_n between law and reason,31 his principal concern in The Laws 
is to provide a detailed legal code that will provide the contours for the 
virtuous society. In this sense, Plato's law is intended to be educative,32 
and supreme. But his educative conception of law takes on a very 
particular approach. Although, rhetorically, he recognizes that law can 
operate through either persuasion or violence, 33 and he eulogizes the 
pedagogical virtues of pursuasive preambles, at bottom, he distinguishes 
between "preambles" and "laws proper" on the basis of penalities, with 
their in-built force and threatening capacity.34 Moreover, he portrays 
noncompliance with law as a "disease" that must be "cured" for the 
benefit of both the individual and the community as a whole. Unpacked 
30. An Introduction to Plato's Laws 39 ( 1983). 
31. See generally The Republic and The Laws, 7 l 3e-714a. 
32. E.g. Laws 63lb-632d. 
33. Laws 722c. 
34. See e.g., ibid 72le, 784c, 853b-c. 
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further, "cure" turns out to be "punishment" and the proposed Platonic 
"remedies" are wide-reaching, including the extensive use of capital 
punishment, the expansion of corporal punishment, the innovative idea 
of "imprisonment", and monetary penalities. 35 
That "education" and "cure" should take on such a repressive nature 
suggests that these propositions are a rationalization of the coercive 
enforcement of a preferred political agenda, the corraling of law as a 
legitimization of the violent imposition of a particular social order. 
Moreover, such an interpretation is supported by even a cursory review 
of his reflections on slavery. Not only does Plato fail to challenge slavery 
in The Laws, he reinforces that institution by imposing even greater 
punishment on slaves than "free men" for similar crimes "because only 
through/ear can the slave population be kept in subordination':36 
What we have in Platonic legal theory, then, is a vision of law as an 
extensive regulator of all aspects of the community and individual life.37 
More specifically, however, it is a conception of regulation shot through 
with the repressive apparatus of the polity, designed to impose by force 
a conception of social relations that aspires to be virtuous, but only on the 
back of violence. Similar themes emerge when we shift from pagan to 
Christian jurisprudence. 
The central legitimizing tenet of Christianity has been its aspiration "to 
love thy neighbour", a desideratum that one might think would be 
antithetical to violence. For example, St. Augustine sought to replace the 
"community of law" with "the community of charity or love",38 an 
aspiration that sits uncomfortably with his extensive vindications of "the 
just war" theory, and his correlative ambivalence towards the fate of 
innocent non-combatants.39 However, it is St. Thomas Aquinas who, 
evaluated by the criteria of sophistication, coherence, longevity and 
influence, represents the zenith of Christian jurisprudence, and against 
whom we can measure the Christian commitment to love. 
Aquinas' Summa Theologica has been both widely celebrated and 
hotly disputed for its ability to synthesize his suggested four categories of 
law, lex aeterna, lex divina, lex naturalis and lex humana. However, 
when we move beyond his certainly impressive enterprise, we encounter 
35. See Laws, Book IX and Stalley supra note 30 at ch. 13. 
36. Stalley, supra note 30 at 149 (emphasis added); see also G.R. Morrow, "Plato and Greek 
Slavery" ( 1939), 48 Mind 186-201. 
37. See, e.g, H. Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel 48 ( 1967). 
38. C.J. Friedrich, supra note 26 at 37. 
39. R.S. Hartigan, "St. Augustine on War and Killing; The Problem of the Innocent" ( 1966), 
27 Journal of the History of Ideas 195; see generally, F.H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle 
Ages ( 1975). 
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a definition of law as "an ordinance of reason for the common good 
made by him who has care of the community and promulgated".40 
Aquinas spends a great deal of time discussing the importance of reason, 
the common good and promulgation, and the factor of care appears to 
dovetail with Christianity's broader ambitions. However, as against 
"care" there is the idea of law being an ordinance, a coercive command. 
When we get down to it, within the Thomist system, 
law, to be effective in promoting right living must have such compelling 
force; . . .  But the power of compulsion belongs either to the community 
as a whole, or to its official representative whose duty it is to inflict 
penalties . . .  He alone, therefore, has the right to make law.41 
And the justification is as follows: 
From the foregoing it is clear that there is in man a natural aptitude to 
virtuous action. But men can achieve the perfection of such virtue only by 
the practice of a "certain discipline". - And men who are capable of such 
discipline without the aid of others are rare indeed. - So we must help 
one another to achieve that discipline which leads to a virtuous life. There 
are, indeed, some young men, readily inclined to a life of virtue through 
a good natural disposition or upbringing, or particularly because divine 
help; and for such, paternal guidance and advice are sufficient. But there 
are others, of evil disposition and prone to vice, who are not easily moved 
by words. These it is necessary to restrain from wrongdoing by force and 
by fear. When they are thus prevented from doing evil, a quiet life is 
assured to the rest of the community; and they are themselves drawn 
eventually, by force of habit, to do voluntarily what once they did only out 
of fear, and so to practise virtue. Such discipline which compels under fear 
of penalty is the discipline of law. Thus, the enactment of laws was 
necessary to the peaceful and virtuous life of men.42 
So, care, a cognate of love, is subordinated to the educative-disciplinary 
virtues of force and fear, for the good of both the community and the 
individual, a princely paternalism that cloaks the violence of the will. 
John Finnis, Aquinas' modern day interlocutor, glosses Aquinas' 
rationalization on the basis that "there is a need for compulsion, to force 
selfish people to act reasonably".43 It is only seifish people upon whom 
legal compulsion is brought to bear? One queries whether in St. Thomas' 
era, or our own, there is a unified "commonality" and a single "common 
good" that could support such a justification for princely power? How 
does this rationalization of violence on the basis of education fit with the 
Thomist defence of slavery? And, what is the connection between these 
40. Summa Theologica Qu. 90, art 4 (hereinafter cited asS. T.]. 
41. Ibid Qu. 90, art 3 um ( emphasis added). 
42. Ibid Qu. 95, art. 1 (emphasis added). 
43. J. Finn is, Natural Law, Natural Rights 28 ( 1980). 
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recalcitrant "selfish people" and the Thomist vindication of private 
property?44 These are questions from the bottom. 
Moreover, even if lex humana does conflict with a higher law, Aquinas 
argues that lex humana may still be binding "in order to avoid scandal or 
disturbance",45 for priority must be given to the public peace, the public 
order. Once again education and virtue are invoked to provide the 
justification for coercion, but when we dig just a little deeper a more 
significant factor surfaces, what I later call "the imperative for the 
preservation of order". This factor is important in that it draws attention 
to the agents involved in the legal process, the perpetrators, benefactors 
and victims of state sanctioned violence. And, once we identify the 
element of human agency, we begin to wonder who, in reality, is on the 
side of the angels? 0�, more cynically, do we simply give up the idea of 
angels completely? Enter Hobbes. 
Despite the important differences between the theologism of Thomist 
jurisprudence and the secularism of John Hobbes' Leviathan, at least one 
element remains constant, the embeddedness of violence in law. 
Compared to what has come before, and much of what is to follow, 
Hobbes is almost refreshingly candid about the violent constitution of 
law. It may be that the vulgarity of his explicitness is the reason why so 
many of Hobbes' jurisprudential successors have sought to distance 
themselves from him, and yet, as we shall see, they remain indebted to 
him. Furthermore, it is suggested that Hobbes' openness may be due, in 
part, to the fact that he was never trained as a lawyer, he did not have to 
reconcile himself to the fact that his chosen profession is imbricated with 
pain and death. 
The whole of Hobbes' social contract thesis is an attempt to provide a 
justification for the absolutist state, as a remedy against the dangers of 
civil war.46 The antisocial state of nature where life is "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short"47 is deliberately constructed48 to provide 
philosophical justification as to why people should submit uncondition­
ally and "consent generically"49 to a sovereign who is omnipotent, 
answerable only to God. For Hobbes, civil laws are decisions of the 
sovereign will, obedience to those laws is essential to preservation of the 
contract, and any breach will be sanctioned, because there must be the 
"terror of some power to cause them to be observed".50 Thus, in a sense, 
44. McLaren, Private Property and the Natural Law ( 1948); Finnis, ibid, at 169-173. 
45. S. T. Qu. 96 art 4. 
46. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History 166-202 ( 1953). 
47. Leviathan, Pt. l, Chap. 13. 
48. John Plamenatz, Man and Society ( 1963), Vol. l at 163-164. 
49. Friedrich, supra note 26 at 88. 
50. Leviathan, ch. xvii (emphasis added). See also ch. xxvi. 
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Hobbes is an important precursor of the positivists, in that he posits that, 
"law properly is the word of him that by right hath command over 
others" and to be effective, there must be: 
some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their 
covenants by terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they 
expect from the breach of their covenant. 51  
Hobbes thoughts on law are, therefore, frank and unreserved. For him 
law is about power, the power of the sovereign to determine and enforce 
his vision of the good society, and enforcement is based upon punishment 
and a calculus of terror. At least the political constituencies are apparent 
in Hobbes' jurisprudence. 
Locke was deeply concerned by the authoritarian and absolutist 
tendencies of Hpbbes' justifications, and sought a less restrictive state, one 
more tolerant of religious diversity,52 one more open to the newly 
emerging classes of English society.53 Although he had a much more 
benign conception of the human personality and the state of nature than 
Hobbes, he also adopted the idea of a social contract through which 
individuals would come together and gain the protection of the state, 
with the built-in proviso that this was a fiduciary trust.54 
Although Locke recognized limits to that trust and provided a 
justification of a right to revolution if the sovereign breached that trust,55 
within those limits he too advocated a conception of politico-legal power 
which involved, 
the right of making laws with Penalties of Death and consequently all less 
penalties, for the regulating and preserving of Property employing the 
force of the community in the execution of such laws and in the defence 
of the commonwealth from foreign injury and all this only for the public 
good.56 
The rub is, of course, whose property is to be regulated and preserved, 
who makes up the "commonwealth", who qualifies as "the public" for 
whom the "good" is exercised, and from whom is it to be protected? The 
"imperative for the preservation of the social order" is, once again, cast 
very broad, an apology for the coercive enforcement of a peculiar and 
particular political preference. Thus, although most of the subsequent 
philosophical and jurisprudential inquiries have concentrated on Locke's 
discussion of the state of nature, the significance of the trust, his liberalism 
5 1. Ibid. ch. xv ( emphasis added). 
52. A Letter on Toleration ed. R. Klinbansky, trans. J.W. Gough ( 1968). 
53. C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism ( 1962). 
54. J.W. Gough, John Locke's Political Philosophy: Eight Studies (1950). 
55. Two Treatises of Government ed. P. Laslett ( 1967). 
56. Cited in Paton, Jurisprudence ( 1972), at 108 (emphasis added). 
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and his individualism, such emphases gloss over an important element of 
consistency with his predecessors: that law is a variation on violence, not 
its transcendence. Differences, important as they may be, arise on the 
basis of this consensus. 
For anyone who is critically concerned about the pervasiveness of 
violence in law and society, the work of Immanuel Kant suggests itself as 
a possible starting point for two reasons. First, as Kant himself says, his 
ambition is to· develop a critical philosophy, one that challenges all 
previous philosophies on the basis of either their skepticism or their 
dogmatism.57 One might be tempted to think that such an ambition might 
challenge the one orthodoxy of all his predecessors, their ultimate 
indentification of "law proper" with violence. 
Second, and even more encouraging, is the potential of what is, 
perhaps, Kant's most· significant contribution to philosophy, his a priori 
first principle: the categorical imperative. Kant takes as his pivotal 
starting point the centrality of the freedom of the individual and, on this 
foundation, constructs a moral theory on the basis of Right.58 Particularly 
significant is his emphasis on the importance of treating people as ends in 
themselves and not as a means to an end: 
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always 
at the same time as an end. 59 
At first blush, such a strongly stated proposition in defence of human 
dignity per se would appear to rule out the infliction of violence on 
another person. And again, his statement of the "Universal Law" would 
also tend to reinforce this optimistic reading of justice as a respect for the 
"other": "Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law."60 Implicit in such a 
proposition is the assumption that the actor would also be subject to the 
universal law, and, I think, it is fair to say that none of us would want to 
be the victims of violence. Thus, it would appear that Kant with his 
transcendental normative order, with its prioritization of the dignity of 
the person, has taken us a long way from the instrumentalist, even 
thanatical, Hobbesian view of social and legal interaction. 
Such a sanguine interpretation can only be maintained, however, at the 
cost of excluding Kant's Metaphysical Elements of Justice (1797),61 a 
57. See Critique of Pure Reason ( 1781) trans. Norman Kemp Smith ( 1933). 
58. See generally, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), trans. H.J. Paton (1964) 
[hereinafter cited as Morals]. 
59. Ibid at no. 66-67, p. 96. 
60. Ibid. at no 52, p. 88. 
6 1 .  Ladd trans. (1965) [hereinafter cited as Justice]. 
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tract published when he was seventy-three, seven years before his death. 
In this work, he provides an extensive - indeed he claims it to be a 
"comprehensive" and "complete"62 - theory of justice and law. Of 
particular relevance to this inquiry is Kant's discussion of the "coercion" 
component of law, and its problematic relation to his much celebrated 
categorical imperative. 
It is at this point that the idealist elements of his transcendentalism 
manifest themselves most clearly, and his orthodoxy with the mainstream 
tradition becomes most explicit. In communion with all his predecessors 
he takes the crucial step of bifurcating law between what he variously 
describes as "private" and "public", "natural" and "civil", "ethical" and 
')uridical" law. The homology with the "natural law/positive law" 
dichotomy becomes explicit through his discussion of the criterion of 
differentiation, the actor's motives for complying with his or her duty. 
Kant's basic proposition is that morality is based upon internal incentives, 
while legality is based upon external coercion. 
"Ethics teaches only that, if the incentive that juridical legislation 
combines with that duty, namely external coercion, were absent, the Idea 
of duty alone would still be sufficient as an incentive."63 
As he says, "right" and the "authorization to use coercion", "means the 
same thing".64 Once more we have the connection, although the 
explanation is different, between real law and coercion. " . . .  
[C]ompulsion is essential to law and a right is characterized by the power 
to compel".65 And it is on this foundation - a bifurcation of Ethics into 
62. The Philosophy of Law 4 ( 1887), Hastie trans. 
63. Justice at 20. He develops this point more generally, although less explicitly, as follows, 
. . .  all legislation can nevertheless be differentiated with regard to the incentives. If 
legislation makes an action a duty and at the same time makes this duty the incentive, 
it is ethical. If it does not include the latter condition in the law and therefore admits 
an incentive other than the Idea of duty itself, it is juridical. As regards juridical 
legislation, it is easily seen that the incentive here, being different from the Idea of duty, 
must be derived from pathological grounds determining will, that is, from inclinations 
and disinclinations and, among these, specifically from disinclinations, since it is 
supposed to be the kind of legislation that constrains, not an allurement that invites. 
The mere agreement or disagreement of an action with law, without regard to the 
incentive of the action, is called legality; but, when the Idea of duty arising from the law 
is at the same time the incentive of the action, then the agreement is called the morality 
of the action. 
Duties ip accordance with juridical legislation can be only external duties because 
such legislation does not require that the Idea of this duty, which is internal, be of itself 
the ground determining the will of the agent. Because such legislation still requires a 
suitable incentive for the law, it can combine only external incentives with the law. 
Ibid at 19 ( emphasis added). 
64. Ibid at 237 (emphasis added). 
65. W. Friedmann, Legal Theory 5th ed. ( 1967), at 1 59-160. 
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morality and law .- that he can proceed to discuss the enforcement of 
• Qi contracts, property rights and his conception of penal law as justified on 
the basis of retribution. It is also worth noting that Kant also advocated 
the monopolization of violence - "to punish, destory or exile" - in so 
• far as he invoked an absolute duty to obey existing legislative power, 
while decrying as an abomination any proposition in favour of a right to 
revolution.66 Viewed in this light, Kant has given a new twist to the 
Rousseauean proposition that, " . . .  the strong is never strong enough to 
be always the strongest, unless he transfers strength into right and 
obedience into duty".67 
Of course, Kant recognizes the tension between his categorical 
imperative, premised as it is on freedom, and the legalization of violence. 
His justification is, at bottom, that state coercion ultimately is an 
enhancement of, rather than a limitation upon, our natural, innate, moral 
freedom, or more pithily, "justice is united with the authorization to use 
coercion".68 Nor should we forget that this is not a description of the law 
as is, it is Kant's vision of how the law ought to be. 
Moreover, the supporting argument for such a claim is particularly 
revealing, given his much touted transcendentalism. Like Hobbes and 
Locke, Kant also invokes the ideas of a "state of nature" and a "social 
contract" to "explain" political authority, although there are some 
variations in their respective accounts. Most importantly, he shares with 
Hobbes the fictional claim that the state of nature is pathological, malign, 
embattled and insecure, and that the only way to avoid this is to 
"consent" (that notoriously indeterminate idea) to enter civil society and 
establish the authority of a compulsive "rule of law": 
"Although experience teaches us that men live in violence and are prone 
to fight one another before the advent of external compulsive legislation 
"69 
Where Kant differs from Hobbes is that he claims that "men" are bound 
by justice to "quit the state of nature" and "subject[ ] himself to a public 
66. Ibid. at 84-89 ( emphasis added). 
67. The Social Contract and Discourses 6 ( 1966). 
68. Justice at 35. He continues 
Coercion, however, is a hindrance or opposition to [lawless] freedom. Consequently, if 
a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to [lawful] freedom according to universal 
laws (that is, is unjust), then the use of coercion to counteract it, inasmuch as it is the 
prevention of a hindrance to freedom, is consistent with freedom according to universal 
laws; in other words, this use of coercion is just. 
See also 80-81. 
69. Ibid. at 76 (emphasis added). 
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lawful external coercion . . .  civil society",70 whereas Hobbes merely 
thought such a move prudential. 
Within the Kantian scheme of things, coercion is legitimate and the 
Rule of Law is distinguished from violence because citizens have 
consented to it and, as a totality, they benefit from it. It is fair to ask 
whether this analysis accurately portrays the experience of his "passive 
citizens", those who have not acquired political rights, such as women, 
children, day labourers and house servants?71 Despite Kantian aspirations 
to prioritize the dignity of the person, despite the virtues of his 
deontological liberalism, and despite his republicanism the question is: 
whose freedom and at what price? When it comes to law, the essentialist 
premise goes unchallenged, and the jurisprudential enterprise becomes 
one of the "ra�ionalization of coercion", a strategy that is based upon 
derivation, dichotomies, fictions and generalities. Plus r;a change, plus 
c 'est la meme chose. 
The historical overview indicates that the normativists - Plato, 
Aquinas, Locke and Kant - recognize the violence of law, but consider 
it unproblematic. It is unquestioned, a given that is rapidly glossed over 
in their haste to discuss the virtues and justifications of their preferred 
polity. But its "assumedness", its "taken for grantedness" and its 
submergence, obscures the vital way in which the violence of law impacts 
upon their vision and the extent to which domination and subordination 
are embedded in the heart of their conceptions of Justice, in so far as their 
Rule of Law acquiesces in its own violence. Consequently, those who 
contemplate justice at length are also those who do the least to 
acknowledge the violence constitutive of their own agendas. This is what 
I mean by a view from the top. 
By an ironic twist of fate, it is the anti-normativists, the positivists, 
those who seek a scientific, non-ideological, apoliticaF2 understanding of 
70. Ibid at 76 (emphasis added). To be fair to Kant, though, he is "realistic" enough to posit 
that 
"from the very nature of uncivilized man it can be inferred that this [ original 
submission] was achieved through the use of violence". 
Ibid at l l  l .  
Such a claim, however, casts doubt on how, exactly, Kant understood the social contract, as 
an "idea of reason" or as "an historical fact". In view of his rationalism and his critique of 
Hobbes, the former is the preferred understanding, but statements like the above suggest the 
historical interpretation. Perhaps the lack of clarity indicates Kant's discomfort with the very 
idea of the social contract, suggesting in tum, the lengths he had to go to in order to rationalize 
his defense of the "compulsive" civil society as against his stronger predisposition for freedom. 
Moreover, the forgoing quotation betrays an essentialist conception of "man's" nature, a point 
I shall return to in Part II of this essay. 
71 .  Ibid at 79. 
72. See Hans Kelsen, rejecting "politics masquerading a jurisprudence" cited in Paton, 
Jurisprudence (3rd) ( 1 972) at 17. 
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law, who go the furthest in their recognition of the violence inherent in 
law. In one sense they can "afford" to admit this, in that their agenda is 
"descriptive" not "normative". 
Despite its widely recognized weaknesses, John Austin's command 
theory is explicit about the connection between domination and 
subordination, law and power. 
"A law . . .  may be said to be a rule laid down for the guidance of an 
intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him."73 
These rules are best understood as command. That is: 
"Every positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in 
a state of subjection to its author"74 
"A command is distinguished from other significations of desire not by the 
style in which the desire is signified, but by the power and purpose of the 
party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be 
disregarded. "75 
The intertwining nature of law and violence within mainstream legal 
thought can be encapsulated in the less than holy trinity of "command, 
duty, sanction".76 Where Austin differs from his predecessors is that he 
stops at this point, while they attempted to provide a justification for this 
constitutionalization of violence. Austin's "virtue" is that at least he puts 
the connection centre stage, whereas many others, while they admit the 
interplay, submerge it in rationalizations, mythical, religious or secular. 
None challenge the identification with, and reduction of, one to the other. 
Hans Kelsen was also an advocate and practitioner of the "science not 
the politics" of law. His "pure theory of law", with its emphasis on a 
hierarchical structure of norms, is expressly designed to demonstrate that 
the "decisive" difference between law and other normative structures is 
the "complusive" nature of law. His aim is to inquire into the measures 
of compulsion exercised by society against those who fail to conform. For 
Kelsen, sanctions are the final and pivotal stage in hierarchies of norms, 
and law, which he identifies as the state concretized, is "a coercive order 
of human behaviour".77 Like Hobbes and Austin he is clear about the 
purpose of a legal order, it is to: 
"inflict [ . . .  ] on the responsible individual an evil - such as deprivation 
of life, health, liberty, or economic values . . .  even against his will by the 
employment of physical force. "78 
73. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined ( ed). Hart ( 1954 ), at l 0 ( emphasis added). 
74. Ibid at 201 (emphasis added). 
75. Austin, Jurisprudence 5 (2nd ed. 1970) (emphasis added). 
76. Ibid at 9. 
77. Pure Theory of Law 33 ( 1967). 
78. Ibid. at 33 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, it is 
"(a)s a coercive order . . .  (that) law is distinguished from other social 
orders. The decisive criterion is the element of force . . .  "79 
Curiously, then, it is the scientists of the law, the would be non­
ideologues, who have identified most explicitly the most political fact 
about law, that it is the imposition of violence. They have taken that to 
be the end of their inquiry when, I would suggest, it should only be the 
starting point. The more important question is why should violence be 
the distinguishing essence of law? Is it possible to conceive of, and put 
into practice, a system of social relations that avoids violence, and yet still 
merits the accolade "legal"? Positivism's "results", though hardly novel, 
open up the possibility for such a speculative inquiry. 
However, as T.S. Eliot reminds us, "humankind cannot bear too much 
reality"80 and the candour of ·positivism is disconcertingly revealing. Its 
open recognition of, and its scientific honesty about, the integral 
connection between law and violence cuts too close to the liberal 
sensibilities of mainstream jurists. Consequently, in the last couple of 
decades, we have experienced a retreat from positivism, and the re­
emergence of a jurisprudential discourse that, consciously or 
unconsciously, obfuscates the violence of law. 
Take for example, the scholarship of John Rawls. His classic tractate, 
A Theory of Justice (1971)  is a splendidly impressive neo-Kantian 
rationalization of the liberal democratic welfare state. The work is a 
classic example of jurisprudence from the top down, in that it attempts to 
discover and argue for determining principles that can provide evaluative 
benchmarks against which the basic structure of a society can be 
measured. The community from which Rawls project emerges, and to 
which it is directed, is a community of academics seeking a coherent 
vision of justice, a community that, perhaps, knows a lot about the 
· purpose of law, but little or nothing about its impact. 
This is not to say that Rawls completely ignores questions pertaining 
to the enforcement of law, rather it is to identify the relative weight which 
he assigns to this concern. Although he admits that "the law defines the 
basic structure within which the pursuit of all other activities takes 
place",81 he does not manage to deal with the issue of the "Rule of Law" 
until he is well over a third of the way into his treatise. Such structural 
decentralization reveals the priority which Rawls attaches to such 
79. Ibid, at 34 (emphasis added). 
80. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral 27 ( 1976). 
81. A Theory of Justice 236 ( 1971 ) [hereinafter cited as Tl.]. 
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concerns. Moreover, his definition of a legal system 1s analytical, 
.i detached, functional and unemotional: 
"a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational persons for the 
purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the framework for 
social co-operation."82 
But why should "social co-operation" and "regulation" only become 
feasible on the basis of a "coercive order"? Rawls' answer is telling in that 
despite his deontological predelictions, on this point he expressly takes us 
back to the leviathan. Following Hobbes, he posits that because "men" 
cannot trust each other to fulfil their mutual obligations, there is a danger 
of "instability" and so " . . .  for this reason alone, a coercive sovereign is 
presumably always necessary . . .  "83 Once again, not only do we have a 
hasty retreat to necessitarianism, we also have an explanation that is so 
vague, unspecific and decontextualized as to be virtually worthless. Thus 
"coercion" (always a more palatable word than "violence") is smuggled 
into the Rawlsian scheme on the basis of inevitability, but once inside it 
can be expanded to support any and all of the preferences espoused by 
the nearly just society, dependent as it is on the "rule of law''.84 
And that is as much as we get. In a six hundred page inquiry into 
justice and the nature of a good society, Rawls can manage only a couple 
of pages that all too quickly assume the connection of law and violence. 
Given Rawls' progressive stature, one could be forgiven for expecting at 
least a little more. 
Perhaps Rawls' myopia can be understood, but not necessarily 
accepted, given that he is a philosopher, not a jurist. The same, however, 
cannot be said of Ronald Dworkin, the reigning, and imperalist85 king of 
the jurisprudential castle.86 Dworkin begins his latest contribution, Law's 
Empire, with the basic question, "What is Law?" However, unlike the 
positivists, he does not attempt to provide us with a practical 
understanding. On the contrary, he directs our attention, again and again, 
to "dauntingly abstract" philosophical questions about "theoretical 
disagreement in law"87 and "the argumentative character of our legal 
82. Ibid. at 235 (emphasis added). 
83. Ibid. at 240. 
84. As an aside, although Rawls does not deal with the issue of law's ambition to monopolize 
violence, it is worth noting that although he provides an attractive justification for civil 
disobedience, his definition of civil disobedience has a built in pre-requisite of non-violence. 
T.J. at 364 and 366. 
85. Law's Empire (1986) [hereinafter cited as Empire]. 
86. Allan C. Hutchinson, "Of Kings and Dirty Rascals: The Struggle for Democracy" ( 1985), 
10 Queen's L.J. 273. 
87. See e.g. Empire, 5, 6, 11. 
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practice".88 Moreover, as if to shift our attention from positivism's 
candour about the repressive power of law, he reclassifies and reinterprets 
positivism to fit the "interpretative turn"89 of recent jurisprudence so that 
it becomes a "semantic theory of law".90 Again, one is reminded of T.S. 
Eliot's concern that we are continually "distracted from distraction by 
distraction". And off rides Dworkin on his new-fangled interpretive 
hobby horse, with its lengthy discussions of "semantic stings", "chain 
novels", "integrity", a literarily adept "Hercules atop Olympus", and 
"Law's Dreams". 
To be fair to Dworkin, he does in fact pay some attention to law's 
connection with domination, but it is a discussion that is so brief, 
apologetic and superficial that it can only serve as a further indictment of 
his already tarnished image. 
Like Rawls,· Dworkin considers that the connection between law and 
violence merits no more than a passing consideration, and he only 
manages to address it about one quarter of the way through his treatise, 
under the euphemistic title, "Grounds and Force of Law".91 The most 
explicit reference is when he happily joins the long tradition of those for 
whom: 
"legal argument takes place on a plateau of rough consensus that if law 
exists it provides a justification for the collective use of power against 
individual citizens or groups."92 
Or as he says a little later, legal philosophers, 
"share a general, unspecified opinion about the force of law . . . the law 
should be obeyed and enforced "93 
The correlative is obvious, the force of law is a non-issue, a "non 
question", for jurists. This is like saying that because the test for 
determining rape has always been measured from the viewpoint of men,94 
then that viewpoint should be accepted, that there is consensus, that it 
does not merit jurisprudential inquiry. Or again, that because all the 
founding fathers practiced slavery, that slavery is not a worthy topic of 
politico-constitutional inquiry. But domination is just that, domination. 
The mere fact that there is consensus amongst the members of a 
particular elite enclave is no justification _for the marginalization of issues 
88. Empire at 14. 
89. See Part II B, 2, b, i, a of this essay, "Trespassers on the Lawns of Patriarchy". 
90. Empire at 33-35. 
9 l .  Ibid at l 08-113. 
92. Ibid at l 08-109 ( emphasis added). 
93. Ibid at 111 (emphasis added). 
94. C. MacKinnon, "Feminist Jurisprudence", supra note 4. 
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of subordination. On the contrary, that very consensus, that ominous 
-1 silence, should suggest to the critical jurist that something is amiss. 
Perhaps because he is a little uncomfortable with such a facile 
confession, Dworkin attempts to bolster his cavalier attitude through a 
rather strained strategy of avoidance. He claims that: 
Academic tradition enforces a certain divison of labor in thinking about 
law. Political philosophers consider problems about the force of law, and 
academic lawyers and specialists in jurisprudence study issues about its 
grounds. Philosophies of law are in consequence usually unbalanced 
theories of law: they are mainly about the grounds and almost silent about 
the force of law. They abstract from the problem of force, that is, in order 
to study the problem of grounds more carefully. 
I think two, interconnected, points are relevant here. Feminists suggest 
that many scholars tend to point to structures as justification for their 
own personal failures to deal with certain issues. This is variously 
described as "reification", or the "denial of agency".95 Viewed from this 
perspective, and temporarily assuming that Dworkin is accurate, 
"academic tradition" does not "enforce"; rather, legal philosophers have 
chosen not to deal with the question of the interconnection between law 
and violence. In this essay I have attempted to indicate why they have 
made such a choice. 
Secondly, Dworkin's claim that there is a division of labour between 
"political philosophers" and "academic lawyers" is misleading and 
unsustainable. As I have indicated, jurists as diverse as Plato, Aquinas, 
Austin, Kelsen and one of Dworkin's own heroes, Kant, have devoted 
significant aspects of their work to a discussion of the "force" of law, as 
well as to its "grounds". What this suggests is that Dworkin does not 
want to deal with the issue of domination through law. Rather, his 
preference is to simply take it for granted, to use it as a foundation upon 
which to construct his own legal empire. The impact of domination does 
not change, but the rhetorical rationalizations do! 
Thankfully, the last few years, there have been indications that, again, 
the tide may be beginning to turn, that the self-imposed myopia of 
mainstream jurists may be weakening, and that a greater consciousness of 
the practical impact of all our theorizing is on the increase. Of particular' 
interest here is the work of the late Robert Cover. After almost two 
decades of pondering the convergence of law and literature,96 in the last 
few years .of his life, Cover began to realize the integral and constitutive 
95. See e.g. Jill McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of An Ontalogical Exile" in Feminism in Canada, 
supra note 12. 
96. "The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation" ( I 986), 20 Georgia L.R. 8 I 5 [hereinafter 
cited as "Bonds"]. 
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connection between law and violence. He began to recognize what 
hitherto had been so obvious as to be unworthy of mention,97 that legal 
interpretation takes place on a field of fear, pain and death.98 Indeed, 
broadening his inquiry, he argued that the legal system - through its 
hierarchicalized division of labour and its role structures of judge, police, 
jailer and other enforcers - is a "pyramid of violence".99 It operated to 
create encompassing "conditions of effective domination': 100 where 
suffering is routinized through an almost trouble-free "transmission of the 
engine of justice".101 The result is not that law eliminates violence, rather 
it is that law normalizes, sanitizes and domesticates violence, 102 and 
attempts to monopolize it. 
These insights of Cover are fundamental. They challenge, at its core, 
our tendency to deify the Rule of Law and our propensities self­
indulgently bask in the sunshine of liberal pluralism, to bullshit on the 
beaches of jurisprudential reflection, while others experience law in 
action, even to the point of death. Cover's ruminations draw our 
attention to "the how of law", to the existential experiences of how 
jurisprudential rationalization shakes down in practice. 
On one level, I agree with Cover that violence is a fundamental reality 
of law in modern society. Where we differ, however, is in our respective 
responses to this consciousness of the pervasiveness of legal violence. Not 
only does Cover acquiesce in the belief that violence is inevitable, 103 he 
actually goes so far as to think it is a good thing. Cover's fatalism 
becomes clear when he posits: 
If it seems a nasty thought that death and pain are at the centre of legal 
interpretation, so be it. . . . As long as pain and death are part of our 
political world, it is essential that they be at the centre of law. The 
alternative is truly unacceptable - that they be in our polity but outside 
the discipline of the collective decision rules and the individual efforts to 
achieve outcomes through those rules. 104 
The problem with this viewpoint is that, as I will suggest below, law is 
not the project of collective decisions, it is the project of certain elements. 
Law is more than a discipline, it is also viciously disciplinary. Moreover, 
97. "Violence and the Word" (1986), 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1610, fn. 22 [hereinafter cited as 
"Word"]. 
98. Ibid at 1629. 
99. Ibid. at 1609. 
100. Ibid at 1616 (emphasis in original). 
IOI.  Ibid at 1619. 
102. Martha Minow, "Interpretating Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover" ( 1987), 96 Yale L.J. 
1860, 1900 [hereinafter cited as "Rights"]. Professor Minow has suggested that my ensuing 
critique of cover is too harsh. 
I 03. "The unseverable connection between legal interpretation and violence" Word at 1610. 
104. Word at 1628 (emphasis in original). 
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Cover may have an unduly narrow vision of the role of the law in our 
polity for he cannot contemplate the possibility of de-centering the 
violence of law which, in turn, just might help to reduce the violence of · 
the polity itself. Law, as I will suggest, is constitutive as well as reflective 
o of the relations of social interaction. 
J 
The problem with Cover's position also runs deeper, premised, I think, 
on his vision of social interaction. He concludes his reflections as follows: 
In law to be an interpreter is to be a force, an actor who creates effects 
even through or in the face of violence. To stop short of suffering or 
imposing violence is to give law up to those who are willing to so act. The 
state is organized to overcome scruple and fear. Its officials will so act. All 
others are merely petitioners if they will not fight back.105 
What we have in Cover's work is a late twentieth century rearticulation 
of the Hobbesian vision of the world. We remain in a state of nature. Law 
with its magisterial hierarchicalized violence, is the great leveller, and to 
have one's interests protected, one's vision developed, enforcement 
through the violence of law is the only way to achieve one's aspirations. 
Still more disconcerting, is Cover's response to our present situation. 
Despite his acute awareness of the pervasiveness of violence both within 
the law, and beyond, he is disturbingly uncritical. Not only does he 
believe that "such a well-coordinated form of violence is an 
achievement"106 he rejects the abolition of the death penalty,107 and his 
consciousness of violence does little to help him empathize with those 
who are subject to this horrifying power: 
"If I have exhibited some sense of sympathy for the victims of this violence, it is misleading. Very often the balance of terror in this regard is 
just as I would want it."10s 
One wonders what black people, indigenous North Americans, other 
minority groups would say about this particular balance?109 His analytical 
reason, it seems, refuses to tolerate either passion for, or empathy with, 
the humanity of his fellow human beings. Furthermore, for Cover, by and 
large, things are fine; to preserve what we have achieved, we have to 
continue as we have always done . . . the sacrificing must continue. If, as 
105. Bonds at 833. 
106. Word at 1624. 
107. Bonds at 831. 
1 08. Word at 1608. 
109. Consider, for example, the vastly disproportionate numbers of natives who make up the 
Canadian prison population. See Michael Jackson, Locking up Natives ( 1988). Or again, how 
about the documented racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty in the 
United States, "Supreme Court: Leading Cases" (1987), 101 Har. L. Rev. 149-159, and more 
generally, the racism of the American criminal process (1988), 101 Har. L. Rev. 1475-1671. 
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he suggests, "law is the projection of an imagined future upon reality"1 10 
the Coverian future is bleak: the continuation of a polity in which lives 
will continue to be "torn apart by these 'organized, social practices of 
violence' "l l 1 where "bodies [remain] on the line",l l2 and where "death 
[is] at the heart of the Constitution". 1 13 The Coverian nomos is thanatical, 
our societal psychosis is to continue and the addiction to violence is to 
remain uncurtailed. 
3. Destabilizing The Assumption: The Potential of a Modernist 
Jurisprudence 
"For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may 
allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never 
enable us to bring about genuine change." 
Audrey Lorde114 
The foregoing overview demonstrates that the belief in the inevitability of 
violence is a "taken for granted", an unquestioned and unquestionable 
assumption in the history of legal philosophy. 115 Such an essentialist 
premise has pervasive, systemic and deleterious ramifications. It 
structures jurisprudential inquiry so as to avoid the fundamental question 
of "why violence", and instead redirects the discourse towards the 
provision of justifications or legitimations for the continued existence of 
violence. 
1 1 0. Word at 1604. 
1 1 1 .  Ibid. at 1601.  
I I 2.  Ibid at 1605. 
113. Bonds at 827. 
Martha Minow is not as pessimistic about Cover's work as I am. She suggests that "Cover's 
work changes the terms of discussion; we cannot go on the way we were going after we hear 
his words." (Rights, at 1863.) I suppose the discourse might change, although I doubt it, but 
on my reading, Cover had little intention of changing the polity. Insight is different than vision: 
his nomos is the continuation of "violent domination". ( Word at 1604 and 1608.) 
Minow also accepts that violence will be inevitable. She correctly points out that private 
bodies and persons frequently use violence, and that very often the only choice is between 
"private violence and public violence". (Rights at 1402.) Although it would be foolish to deny 
that there is ever a time when violence is always prohibited, I want to resist the potentially 
limiting connotations of Minow's position. I think she comes dangerously close to seeing power 
as having as its only variant, violence, whereas I want to suggest, below, that power can 
manifest itself in a variety of ways. Progressive scholars and activists should be careful not to 
be outflanked by an understanding of the world that deradicalizes their fundamental insights 
and potentials. Is the only possibility for dealing with oppression and domination, further 
domination? 
1 14. Sister Outsider 111 ( 1 984 ). 
115. The critique also applies to left analyses of modern law. See in particular, my "On the 
Road to Radical Reform: A Critical Review of Unger's Politics" (1989), 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
(forthcoming). 
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I do not want the reader to misunderstand the purpose of this historical 
revision. It is not an argument that traditional jurists are nothing more 
than vulgar apologists for certain interests, although that may be the case 
in certain instances. Nor is it an argument that seeks to devalue the 
importance of their contributions to the question of "justice" and 
"authority". Emphatically, it is not an attempt to tar them all with the 
same brush, to ignore the vitally important differences between them. All 
of these differences, and more, are important and legitimate jurispruden­
tial concerns. 
But jurisprudence can neither expect nor demand closure. Contempor­
ary wisdom cannot, and should not, delimit the contours of 
contemporary or future inquiry. Indeed, on the contrary, it is the 
responsibility of jurisprudence to critique and reflect upon conventional­
ism, for knowledge · itself is power. Therefore, although all of our 
jurisprudential forefathers make explicit reference to the violence of law, 
in the main, it has been glossed over and peripheralized, rendered· almost 
invisible by its assumedness. The result is jurisprudential complacency in, 
and worse, a reinforcement of, the banal nature of legal violence. It 
would, of course, be foolish to deny the reality of violence, but must 
jurisprudence take the further step and accept that it is an inevitable 
reality? Legal theory, as a critical discursive practice, can and should ask 
the prior question of whether legal violence is inescapable and ponder the 
possibility of whether we, as a community, could do better. 
In raising this question of whether the connection between law and 
violence is necessary, I draw inspiration from what, roughly, may be 
described as modernism.116 The opportunity provided by modernism is, 
116. Modernism, as a phenomenon, emerges from the interface between the aesthetic and the 
political. To attempt to provide a determinative definition of modernism would be impossible, 
indeed, anti-thetical to its significance, but one commentator suggests that some of its key 
themes include, but are not limited by, 
"an intense concern with the mediation of "content" by form; use of synchronous 
montage as an alternative to merely linear additive time; techniques of "de­
familiarizing" the object-world; cultivation of paradox and ambiguity as opposed to 
monolithic notions of a single objective reality; and exploration of the fragmented and 
alienated experience of individuals in modern urban and industrial societies . . .  " 
Eugene Lunn, Marxism and Modernism 2 ( 1982). See also Marshall Berman, All That Solid 
Melts Into Air ( 1982); S. Spender, The Struggle of the Modern ( 1963); Jo Anna Isaac, The 
Ruin of Representation and Modern Art and Texts ( 1986). For discussions and examples of its 
impact on contemporary jurisprudence, see e.g. David Luban, "Legal Modernism" (1986), 84 
Michigan L.Rev. and Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics ( 1975); Passion: An 
Essay on Human Personality (1984); Politics ( 1987); D.  Cornell, "Towards a Modern/ 
Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics" ( 1985), 133 U.Pa.L.Rev. 295. For a further critical 
discussion of modernism, see my review essay of Unger's Politics, "On the Road to Radical 
Reform" 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming), and my "Towards An/other Legal Education" 
(1989), 12 U.N.B. L.J. (forthcoming). 
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as yet, unrealized, unimagined, unimaginable. One of the central themes 
of modernism is contingency, the awareness that essentialism is a fraud, 
with the therapeutic and emancipatory correlative consciousness that 
things could be different. It provides us with a unique opportunity to 
question the unquestioned assumptions that underpin social interaction 
and knowledge. As such, modernism helps to subvert what is, at bottom, 
a repressive " 'regime' of truth", 1 17 the disempowering discourse and 
ideology of necessitarianism.1 18 By drawing on modernism's conscious­
ness of contingency we can legitimately ask the fundamental question of 
whether violence is inevitable for social interaction. More specifically, a 
modernist jurisprudence queries whether law should be shackled in the 
dungeons of violence, or whether it can be re-imagined and transformed 
so as to challenge violence, to be an instrument of soccour rather than a 
mechanism of communal torture. 
Furthermore, modernism allows us to de-reify law, to see it is an 
artifact, constructed by social actors and therefore capable of 
reconstruction by social actors.1 19 It also allows us to inquire who these 
social actors are, why they understand law the way they do, and to 
problematize why their vision should be universalized as the essence of 
law. Modernism's critique of essentialism opens up new horizons for 
social interaction. 
IV. The Violence of Contemporary Legal Systems 
''Beware, my friend, of the signifier that would take you back to the 
authority of a signified!" 
Helene Cixous120 
"The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticize the workings 
of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize 
and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has 
always exercised itself obsurely through them will be unmasked, so that 
one can fight against them " 
Noam Chomsky & Michel Foucault121 
In this section, I shift the focus of -attention from historical overview to 
contemporary analysis in order to demonstrate that, as heirs of this 
jurisprudential heritage, we too accept as normal and necessary the 
channelling of violence through law. To this end, two arguments are 
117. Michel Foucault Power/Knowledge 133 (1979). 
118. Unger, Politics ( 1 987). 
119. Ibid 
120. "The Laugh of the Medusa" (1976), 4 Signs 875, 892. 
121. Chomsky and Foucault, "Human Nature: Justice versus Power" in F. Elder, Reflexive 
Water 1 70 ( 1974 ). 
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developed: the first is an outline of what I describe as "interactional 
theory of law"; the second is a description of some of "the functions" 
which law fulfills within contemporary western liberal democratic 
society, and, more importantly, an analysis of the relationship between 
these "functions".122 
1 .  From Reification To Interactionalism 
Liberalism and traditional Marxism tend to have a rather technical 
conception of law, they treat it as an entity, they "either personalize or 
commodify" it. Liberalism, working on an assumption of consensus, 
portrays the law as a subject, the neutral arbiter and great leveler above 
and beyond the mass of social interaction.123 Traditional Marxism, on the 
other hand, working • on an assumption of conflict portrays law as an 
object, a malleable instrument in the hands of the ruling class for 
dominating the working class. 124 Both approaches not only over-simplify 
and are ideal typical, they also misunderstand and mischaracterize the 
nature of law. I suggest that we must "flick the switch", that we stop 
thinking of law as a thing - subject or object - that we recognize law 
as relational. 
� To better comprehend the nature and functions of law in contempor-
ary society we must recognize that it is a complex, double-edged and 
deeply fissured condensation of social relations. Like society, the 
economy, state and ideology, law cannot be treated as a static 
monolith.125 Law is not a thing, it is relational, part of the ensemble of 
social relations. It is a material condensation of social relations in so far 
as it is an aspect of human interaction where competing interpretations, 
attitudes and visions fuse, conflict, merge, coalesce and mutually modify 
each other and then reemerge as either rules, or in the guise of legal 
122. This section is a much abbreviated version of a significantly longer article, "Law's 
Centaur: A Preliminary Theoretical Inquiry into the Nature and Relations of Law, State and 
Violence" ( 1989), Osgoode Hall L.J. 220. 
123. For a classic example of the assumption of consensus (with its built-in premise of 
sameness) at work see Dworkin's Law's Empire (1986), in which he portrays law as a neutral, 
if pluralist, subject capable of incorporating and accomodating a wealth of diverse social 
desires and interests. See also, Bruce Ackerman, Reconstructing American Law ( 1985). 
For a critique of the assumption of consensus see Michael Mann , "The Social Cohesion of 
Liberal Democracy" (1970), 35 Am. Soc. Rev. 423. 
124. See e.g., Marx and Engels on Ireland (1972); K. Marx, The Civil War in France (1870); 
The German Ideology ( 1845); V. Lenin, The State and Revolution ( 1976); F. Pearce, Crimes of 
the Powerful ( 1970). 
125. See generally Antonio Gramsci , Selections from Prison Notebooks (Q. Hoare, G. Nowell 
Smith eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as "S.P.N."]; Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social 
Classes ( 1971) [hereinafter cited as P.P.S.C.], State, Power and Socialism ( 1979) [hereinafter 
cited as �.P.S.]. 
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personnel (for example, a judge, police officer or arbitrator), or through 
an institution such as the courts. Law is one arena in which people choose 
(or perhaps more commonly are forced to choose) to attempt to fulfill 
their nature as social beings. An awareness of relationalism, in turn, 
emphasizes the importance of law's interactional texture. 
This is not, however, a pluralist analysis of law which portrays it as a 
neutral arena which absorbs all relative viewpoints, digests them, 
evaluates them objectively and spits out a decision or announces a role 
which its functionaries are to fulfill. Such an approach incorporates a 
reified view of law. The relationships involved are much more internal 
than this pluralist vision. The people interacting are sentient persons who 
are in different social positions; some rich, some poor, some white, some 
black, some male, some female, some religious, some areligious, some 
educated some uneducated etc. These people express their interpretations, 
their desires, their fears and their visions through the law. Law itself must 
therefore be studied in terms of classes and class fractions, political parties 
and political cliques, gendered preferences and bureaucratic predelictions, 
pluriclassite and cultural movements and all their corresponding 
ideologies. Law is created by the interaction of all these social forces, and 
in turn helps create the way in which these social forces interact. Law is 
both created and creator. 126 It is a peculiar and particular response to 
human and social interraction, the reactive condensation of the fluid 
motion of human relationships. Moreover, as a powerful form of 
(ir)rationality in contemporary society, law is an active agency, one 
which provides frameworks, guidelines and direction for the structuring 
of human and social relations. Law, in the present politico-historical 
conjuncture, is a vital arena of social interaction; it is constitutive 127 as 
much as it is reactive. 
126. It is only by adopting this interactional approach that we can sufficiently comprehend the 
contradictory reality of law. As Edward Thompson argues: "I found that law did not keep 
politely to a level but was at every bloody level; it was imbricated within the mode of 
production and productive relations themselves (as property rights, definitions of agrarian 
practice) and it was simultaneously present in the philosophy of Locke; it intruded brusquely 
within alien categories, reappearing bewigged and gowned in the guise of ideology; it danced 
cotillion with religion, moralizing over the theatre at Tyburn; it was an arm of politics, politics 
was one of its arms; it was an academic discipline, subjected to the rigor of its own autonomous 
logic; it contributed to the definition of the self-identity both of rulers and ruled; above all it 
afforded an arena for class struggle, within which alternative notions of law were fought out." 
Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act 288 ( 1977). 
127. The term "constitutive" is simply another way of expressing the idea of an interactional 
theory of law. The term first emerges in Klare's excellent article, "Law-making as Praxis" 
( 1979), 40 Telos 123, 128 and later in Tushnet's "Marxism as Metaphor" (1983), 68 Cornell 
L. Rev. 281, 285-87. For a favourable response see Alan Hunt, "The Theory of Critical Legal 
Studies" ( 1986), 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 37-43 where he pithily comments, " .. . 
law both constitutes and is constituted" at 38. 
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An important consequence of interactionalism is that the values 
inherent in law can no longer be viewed as transcendental, rising above 
factional partisanship. On the contrary, law becomes another aspect of 
social relations where partisanship expresses itself; law is not distinct from 
politics, but integral to politics.128 Legal rules are an expression of 
individual's - perhaps mediated and encoded, but still incorrigible -
subjective interests not objective, rational standards by which to evaluate 
society. Legal institutions are composed of human beings who have 
irrepressible social contexts and thus have individual backgrounds, 
attitudes, values and aspirations which infiltrate and orient those 
institutions in certain directions rather than others. Put briefly, 
modernism's legacy of contingency, indeterminacy, relativism, and 
subjectivity provides the manifestly unstable foundation for contempor­
ary legal rules and legal institutions. Viewed from the perspective of 
interactionalism, "legality" is a politico-cultural construct, and the ideal 
of the Rule of Law must, therefore, be rendered vulnerable to critical 
appraisal. 
2. Legal Constitutivism 
The point of interactionalism is to demonstrate that modern law reacts to. 
a plethora of competing social forces, although by no means equally, 
while at the same time structuring and moulding, to a significant degree, 
the form and substance of contemporary social reality itself. Law fulfills 
this constitutive role in a variety of ways, what I describe as its 
"ideological", "facilitative" and "violent" functions.129 
(i). Ideological Role of Law 
Law fulfills an ideological function insofar as it acts as a cohesive factor 
in structuring current social relations. Put differently, law in modern 
society fulfills a "directive" function in that it attempts to educate, instruct 
and adapt much of the population to the norms on the vision of those 
128. Joseph Singer, "The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory" (1984), 94 Yale 
L.J. l ;  Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986). See also R.F. 
Devlin "Ventriloquism and the Verbal Icon" (1988), 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. I .  
129. To avoid misunderstanding, I want to make it clear that to use the word "function" does 
not mean that I accept or employ the methodology, assumptions or preferences of 
"functionalism", with its tendency to reduce complexity to tidy coherence. Indeed, as my 
discussion of legal violence will indicate, it is because of law's "disfunctional" propensities that 
violence is important. "Function" is used descriptively, not as a term of art. 
The breakdown, in part, draws upon the work of K. Kiare, "Praxis", supra note 127 and M. 
Tushnet, "Perspectives on the Development of American Law" (1977), Wisconsin L.R. 81. 
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who have power in society. In this regard, law as ideology is formative. 
Its purpose is to achieve an acceptable level of consensus and to create 
sufficient stability in order that existing social relations may continue. To 
adopt the discourse of Antonio Gramsci, law as ideology aspires to 
generate "spontaneous consent" and "the will to conform", attitudes that 
indicate that some social group has attained a condition of hegemony. 130 
A great deal of progressive scholarship has developed over the last 
decade or so emphasizing the ideological role which law fulfills. In 
particular, despite their differences, this has been the central focus of 
concern for both critical legal scholars and feminists.131 By decoding and 
reinterpreting the ideological significance of post-industrial, patriachal 
law such scholarship has exorcised the phantasm of legal neutrality, and 
highlighted the various and ingenious ways in which cohesiveness has 
been achieved ·at the price of marginalization, exclusion and inequality. 
Moreover, the critique has emphasized the "put togetherness" of law, de­
reifying it to identify that it is not law that creates society, but just the 
reverse, that is, it is particular people who create law to regulate their 
own social relations. The ideological critique reinforces our awareness of 
law's artifactual quality. 
However, while the discovery of the ideological significance of law as 
a cohesive factor is vital, it is important not to over-emphasize this 
approach. It is only one of at least three functions which modern law 
fulfills in the present politico-historical conjuncture. One exclusionary 
paradigm should not be replaced with another. 
(ii) The Facilitative Role of Law 
A second manner in which law contributes in a vital way to the 
maintenance and continuation of post-industrial, patriarchal social 
relations can be characterized as facilitative. In one sense, all law which 
fulfils a cohesive function can be said to be facilitative in that, by 
smoothing out contradications, it makes easier the continuation of 
modern society. Facilitative, in the sense used here, is narrower because 
it deals with those aspects of legal relations which more directly pertain 
to the economic side of human interaction, dovetailing with what Lon 
Fuller used to describe as law's "channelling" function. For example, 
1 30. Gramsci, S.P.N., supra note 125 at 195. 
131 . See the bibliographies collected by Duncan Kennedy and Karl Klare (1984), 94 Yale 
L.J. 461, Fran Olsen and Mary Joe Frug, "Bibliography of Feminist Legal Scholarship" 
(unpublished 3/23/87); Susan Boyd and Elizabeth Sheey, "Bibliography, Canadian Feminist 
Perspectives on Law" (March 1 986). 
.. 
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facilitative laws are those such as property law, company law, trusts, 
etc.132 
The facilitative role of law, like the ideological role, is oriented towards 
the attainment of a hegemonic condition. It can be characterized as: 
"A set of rules which organizes capitalist exchange and provides a real 
framework of cohesion in which commercial encounters can take 
place". 133 
But again we must be careful. Facilitative law, while a veritable "ace" 
in the deck of legal legitimization can also be a "joker" insofar as the 
state, through law, has adopted an increasingly interventionist role in the 
structuring of the economy. Inevitably, such involvement operates to the 
advantage and disadvantage of different social groups, once again 
indicating the absence of neutrality, and the centrality of power(lessness) 
in legal relations. Thus facilitative law is itself structurally insecure. While 
being vitally cohesive, it is also incorrigibly destabilizing, rendering the 
attainment of hegemony that much more elusive. 
(iii) The Violent Role of Law 
Traditionally, in reference to this function, jurists adopt a usually more 
amorphous, or perhaps euphemistic, term such as "compulsive", 1 34 
"coercive"135 or "repressive".1 36 I think a more precise, immediate - and 
perhaps disturbing - analysis can be developed on the basis of the term 
"violence", which I use in the narrow, direct sense of physical injury or 
harm. 137 Lest there be confusion about my proposition, I want to be 
explicit. The connection between law and violence is not simply 
descriptive of the law in action, it is an endemic feature of modern law, 
a direct consequence of what I call "the imperative of the preservation of 
132. It is crucial to bear in mind, however, that the categorization is somewhat arbitrary, and 
that it is possible to consider this facilitative function as a subfunction of the ideological role 
of law, if ideology is taken to express itself in material forms through social relations, as I have 
argued elsewhere. See supra note 122. The reason for dealing with facilitative law as a distinct 
category is that its origins lie in, and have greatest impact upon, relations between various 
factions of the bourgeoisie. Essentially, facilitative law is intraclass, although due to the 
pervasiveness of law, it also has important effects on interclass relations. 
133. Poulantzas, P.P.S.C., supra note 125 at 53. 
134. See generally Part III. of this essay. 
135. Ibid 
136. Tushnet and Klare, supra note 127. 
137. I am fully conscious that "violence" can be defined in a variety of different ways, 
definitions that usually correlate with particular political preferences. I adopt this very narrow 
interpretation, because if I am right on the basis of this approach, the wider the definition the 
more expansive the indictment of modern law. See generally my " Law's Centaur . . .  ", supra 
note 122 at footnotes 138 and 139 for a lengthy discussion of the ideological significance of 
competing interpretations of "violence". 
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stability". Existing society seeks to preserve itself in its established, known 
form; those groups who benefit from a particular configuration of social 
relations strive to preserve that situation. The State, as a material 
condensation of those social relations, also functions to preserve the status 
quo; specifically, through its cohesive role. But the contradictions are too 
great, and since modern society is in continual flux, groups desiring social 
change continually emerge. When their demands become too loud, when 
they refuse to comply with or acquiesce in, or when they challenge and 
criticize the status quo, "accommodation" is replaced by coercion. Law 
is a vital part of these social relations. Through its ideological and 
facilitative roles, law strives to attain the hegemonic condition. However, 
"contradictory consciousness", an awareness of exploitation, domination 
and inequality, continually breaks through and consensus weakens. 
There may be widespread respect for the Rule of Law in western 
liberal democratic society, but at the same time there is also an awareness 
of inequality, unfairness and injustice, an awareness that often manifests 
itself as non-compliance with, disregard for, or resistance to the legally 
enforced order. Such resistance, such insubordination, in and of itself 
challenges the hierarchy and authority structures of contemporary society 
and is interpreted as a threat to the social order. Law plays a crucial role 
in terminating this perceived threat. As Colin Sumner points out, " . . .  the 
legal system is first and foremost a means of exercising political 
control". 138 
The political control of "deviants" through law operates on two levels. 
First, their undisciplined conduct is set against a backdrop of threats to 
law and order, caricatured as the thin edge of the wedge of social 
disintegration and chaos. The capacity of law to perform this ideological 
feat of reinterpretation, in turn, represents law as the community's 
salvation, thereby sanctifying legal violence as the only available, and 
legitimate, resolution of the problem. Put differently, by shifting the focus 
from the reasons for non-compliance to a discourse of "respect", 
"security", "enforcement", "compliance" and "criminality" we indirectly 
legitimize the violence that is used against those who fail to comply. 
Enforcement - read violence - is the second level, and, in the main, is 
not seen as problematic because, filtered through the legal structures, it is 
no longer violence, it is law. Viewed from the bottom, however, it is both. 
This is not instrumentalism. It is not law as a tool in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie; rather it is law, the people, the principles and the rules as part 
of the process of human interaction. The people who make and enforce 
the rules are social beings who have a position in the flux of human 
138 . Reading Ideologies 277 (l 979). 
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interrelations. They see their society threatened by deviant and disruptive 
elements: the poor, native people or blacks, the lazy, the spongers, the 
gays, the AIDS carriers, the anarchists or the commies. Even women. 
They perceive a cloud of chaos shadowing their lives; they detect 
alternative possibilities that simply do not fit with their preferences for 
certainty, stability and normalcy. Contrary to some instrumentalist 
critiques, their motivations do not arise out of a bad faith, or conscious 
bias, but rather out of fear. It is not a great conspiracy that leads to the 
resort to legal violence, rather it is people living their lives in accordance 
with their ideology, their sense of reality, who see their world menaced.139 
They will fight to preserve that world, that reality. The imperative of the 
preservation of stability means that violence is as endemic to modern law 
as either ideology or fa�ilitation. 
(iv) The Genius of Law 
I hope that, by now, I have said enough to refute the counter-positioning 
of law and violence and to demonstrate both the reality and 
pervasiveness of legal violence in contemporary western liberal­
democratic society. Though useful, my argument does not make 
sufficient progress on either a theoretical or practical level. I have not said 
enough about the relationship between the various legal functions. 
Specifically, my argument has a fundamental weakness, it indulges in 
dichotomization. It works on the premise of the couplet "consent or 
coercion", an approach which is, I think, inadequate for a project that 
hopes to re-vision law. The relationship between law as ideology (which 
also includes the facilitative role of law) and law as violence cannot be 
grasped simply by their mere conjuction or addition. In brief, an analysis 
which only goes as far as to argue that law can be either ideological or 
violent, or ideological and violent does not do enough for an agenda that 
aspires to be transformative. 
Although such an argument is moving in the correct direction, it is 
problematic. The implicit methodology looks at the quantity (extent) of 
hegemonic leadership or ideological pre-eminance, and quantity (extent) 
of coercion or violence. It implies that the greater the violence, the less 
139. Several sociological-psychological studies of police attitudes indicate that they see 
themselves as the last line of defence against chaos, the thin blue line in a hostile environment. 
See, e.g., W.A. Westley, Violence and Police (1970); J.Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police 
Behaviour, (1968); S. Holdaway, Inside the British Police, (1983); P.K. Manning, Police Work, 
(1977). See also C.J. Vick, "Explaining Police Pessimism, R.C. Adam, "The Police 
Personality", both in D.W. Pope and N.L. Weiner, Modern Policing, (1981); and P. Gorman 
and A. �oleman, "Conservatism, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism in British Police Officers" 
( 1982), 16 Sociology; M. Brogden, Police, Autonomy and Consent, ( 1982). 
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the spontaneous consent, suggesting, in turn, that the two are variables 
which mutually adjust in automatic response. It is a zero-sum, hydraulic­
piston approach; as one increases, the other automatically decreases. This 
approach fails, in my opinion, to capture the pathological genius of law. 
Law does many things in modern society: it creates a world which 
obscures the harshness of social relations and legitimates oppression. It 
diffuses potential dissent and creates an acceptable level of exploitation. 
It even provides real benefits for most members of society, even though 
these do not accrue anything like equally. Law, by removing some of the 
excesses of exploitation, by mediating the disadvantages of current 
society, contributes, in the long run, to the continuance of the inherent 
inequality since it smooths out the jagged edges, and encourages 
acquiescence. Yet its genius lies in none of these. Law's genius lies in its 
ability to make two acts, which are essentially the same, politically 
different. Law makes legal violence legitimate, and illegal violence 
illegitimate; violence which is legal becomes acceptable in the popular 
psyche, even when used against those who's dissent is peaceful. Ideology 
is inherently incapable of transcending the factors of disequilibrium in a 
post-industrial, patriarchal society; instability will surface, and "when in 
doubt" those who have been threatened by social instability will "lash 
out". Legal relations are carried out by such people. Law has a very 
human face with very human instincts. Law is people in action, but more 
important, it is legal people in action, thus its action appears to be 
legitimate. The genius of law stems from its capacity for legal aoo 
legitimate violence. Legal violence and legal ideology co-exist in a 
permanent, threatening, mutually reinforcing unity, for "repression never 
comes unpackaged". 140 
There is another way in which we can understand the nature of the 
relationship between violence and ideology. Althusser and Poulantzas 
have drawn an important distinction between that which is dominant and 
that which is determinative.141 Dominant can be understood as a 
quantative concept, while determinative can be understood as a 
qualitative concept. "Dominance" suggests that certain factors or 
concepts stand out as being the most significant criteria. When this is 
applied to law, the most significant (dominant) thing about it, is its claim 
to legitimacy. Law is, within current social relations, a major arbiter of 
the limits of acceptability. This is what makes law so effective in liberal 
democratic society and gives importance to juridico-political ideology. 
140. Miller and Fine, Policing the Miners Strike l O ( 1986). 
141. Althusser, "On Contradiction and Overdetermination" in For Marx ( 1976) and 
Poulantzas S.P.S. supra note 125 at 79. 
Modern Law and Theory 345 
However, this dominance of the ideologial aspect of law is not immune 
from social relations; on the contrary, law as ideology is dominant only 
because of the nature of current social relations. The analysis I have 
offered of these relations is that they are overdetermined by (they have as 
their fundamental priority) the imperative to maintain the current social 
order. I have suggested, however, that such societies are in a rapid state 
of flux, and that this had fostered dissent, dissatisfaction, non-compliance 
and protest. The priority for law is to preserve stability and when 
confronted with difference, discordance and heterodoxy, this imperative 
can be achieved only through resort to coercion and violence. Violence 
is the determinative aspect of law. 
Legal violence is continually present; it is the foundation upon which 
social relations are built in a post-industrial, patriarchal social formation. 
As Poulantzas suggests: 
State monopolized physical violence permanently underlies the techniques 
of power and mechanisms of consent; it is inscribed in the web of 
disciplinary and ideological devices; and even when not directly exercised, 
it shapes the materiality of the social body upon which domination is 
brought to bear. 142 
Law is that moment; that specific set of social relations which has as its 
distinctive feature the capacity for supreme, yet legitimate, overt violence. 
Modern law has failed us as a community because its response to 
humankind's fundamental dilemma - the antinomies of mutual longing 
and mutual jeopardy, mutual need and mutual fear143 - has not been 
through the transcendence of repression, or the acceptance of 
"otherness", but rather through the rationalization, institutionalization 
and constitutionalization of violence. The result is dialectic of hegemony 
and violence which can be devastating - even deadly - to those who 
are at the bottom. 
V. A Synopsis 
"The stabilization of a social world requires the spiritualization of 
violence." 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger144 
In this first part of "Nomos and Thanatos" I have attempted, by the 
means of several interpretive techniques, to critically adumbrate the 
nexus between law and violence. The narratives reported in the "Celtic 
Triptych" indicate two theses of this essay. First, that there is no single, 
14 2. Poulantzas ibid at 81. 
143. See Roberto Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personality (1984). 
144. False Necessity 398 ( 1987). 
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categorically privileged or true interpretation of the significance, purpose 
or effect of law. One's context determines one's reality. A second thesis 
is that, traditionally, the view from the bottom has been excluded from 
the jurisprudential conversation, silenced by those who are the 
gatekeepers of discursive hegemony. 
With this perspective in mind, I shifted the focus to a jurisprudential 
archaeological dig that revealed a common link between all of our 
jurisprudential forefathers: an essentialist belief in the inevitability of law 
as constituted by violence. This is the third thesis of the essay. A fourth 
thesis is that despite their significant differences, to a man each of these 
jurists either submerged the connection between law and violence, or 
assumed it to be unproblematic. The political significance of this 
tolerance and legitimation of violence impacts upon us all. Consider for 
example, the ease with which those of us who have been trained as 
lawyers use the phrase "no force or effect". Note which word comes first, 
reflect upon the assumption that we buy into through an uncritical and 
unquestioning acceptance of such a prioritization. Is it inevitable that the 
effect of law is dependent upon its force? Phrases such as this, I sugge�t, 
are legalized doublespeak, indicating the extent to which we have 
accepted the discursive normalization of violence, highlighting our 
complicity in the perpetuation of domination and subordination. This is 
a fifth thesis. 
Having unmasked the tendency of male-stream jurisprudence _to 
desensitize us to the violence of law, I turned to a brief analysis of the 
nature and functions of contemporary law. The sixth thesis posited that 
theory and practice - for once - unite, and that modern legal systems 
do, in reality, have as their determinative criterion their ideological 
monopoly of violence. Essentialism, it would seem, has won out. 
However, the great strength o_f critique is that if you push it far enough, 
it will eventually begin to suggest angles for reconstruction. By unpacking 
the taken for granted assumption that law is premised upon violence, the 
final section,with its emphasis on the interactional significance of human 
agency, began to suggest that perhaps the reason for this presupposition 
is to be located in anxiety and fear. In particular, it hinted that perhaps 
the reason why we so readily accept the banality of legal violence is 
because we assume that the relationships we have with each other are 
basically predatory. I want to suggest that such a perspective upon human 
relations is itself constructed upon an assumed theory of human nature, 
one that envisions a sharp demarcation of the "self' and the "other". If, 
however, we did not automatically accept such a vision of social 
interaction, if we could conceive of the relationship of self and other as 
being one of interdependence and interconnection rather than antinomy, 
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then perhaps our envisaged legal regime - as a regulatory mechanism of 
social interaction - would not necessarily· be constructed on the 
constitutionalization of violence. These are the concerns addressed in the 
cautious reconstructive sequal of "Nomos and Thanatos: Feminism as 
Jurisgenerative Transformation, or Resistance Through Partial 
Incorporation?". 
Footnote 12 continued from page 301 
important to point out that I am not working on an assumption of consensus, that we all share 
the same interpretive community. The community to which this paper is directed is a particular 
community, a progressive community, and as such is only one of many potential communities 
which co-exist, although n.ot necessarily in conditions of equality.) or "dialogic" (Allan 
C. Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold: Critical Essays in Modern Legal Thinking ( 1987) ) 
community. In the last decade or so, feminism has been slowly beginning to articulate a new 
language, one which gives voice to women's experiences, perspectives and aspirations. This is 
the voice of "the other", the disempowered, the silenced. It is also a vibrant voice which, 
although still marginal and constrained, has already begun to demand and describe an 
alternative conception of social interaction, one based on greater interconnectedness and 
receptivity. This perspective understands discourse to be oriented towards a mutual 
understanding of needs and desires. This language does not presuppose a priori right answers 
or essential truths, it is open and polyvocal. (Tori! Moi, Sexual/Textual Politics 68 ( 1986) ). It 
is to this dialogic community that this paper is oriented. 
Moreover, I have tried very hard to avoid imperial scholarship (Richard Delgado, "The 
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature" (1984), 132 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 561 ). Professor Delgado points out the very real dangers of imperial scholarship as 
"factual ignorance or naivete, . . .  failure of empathy, and inability to share values, desires and 
perspectives of the population whose rights are under consideration . . .  " (at 568) and further 
proceeds to 
" . . .  compile an a priori list of reasons why we might look with concern on a situation 
in which the scholarship about group A is written by members of group B. First, 
members of group B may be ineffective advocates of the rights and interests of persons 
in group A. They may lack information; more important, perhaps, they may lack 
passion, or that passion may be misdirected. B's scholarship may tend to be sentimental, 
diffusing passion in useless directions, or wasting time on unproductive breast-beating. 
Second, while the B's might advocate effectively, they might advocate the wrong things. 
Their agenda may differ from that of the Ns, they may pull their punches with respect 
to remedies, especially where remeoying A's situation entails uncomfortable 
· consequences for B. Despite the best of intentions, B's may have stereotypes embedded 
deep in their psyches that distort their thinking, causing them to balance interests in 
ways inimical to A's. Finally, domination by members of group B may paralyze 
members of group A, causing the A's to forget how to flex their legal muscles for 
themselves." (p. 567). 
Luce Irigaray makes a similar point: 
"I will never be in a man's place, a man will never be in mine. W hatever the possible 
identifications, one will never exactly occupy the place of the other - they are 
irreducible the one to the other." 
Cited in Martha Minow, "Supreme Court 1986 Term, Forward: Justice Engendered" (1987), 
101 Harvard L. Rev. 10, 45 [hereinafter cited as "Justice Engendered"). 
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I do not intend to speak for women or in the name of women, rather I seek to speak with 
women. It is unclear to me whether it is ever possible for a biological male to be a feminist, 
(For discussions Men in Feminism, A. Jardine & P. Smith eds. (1987); R.W. Connell, Gender 
and Power (1987), Introduction; K. Lahey, "Until Women Themselves Have Told All That 
They Have To Tell" (1985), 23 Osgoode Hall L. J. 519, 520. See also A. Miles, M. O'Brien, 
and P. Hughes in Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics 213, 251 and 296 (A. Miles 
& G. Finn eds. 1982), [hereinafter cited as Feminism in Canada] but it is at least my aspiration 
that males can be pro-feminist in so far as they sincerely believe in and give support to feminist 
visions and projects for a reconstructed, post-patriarchal world. Thus, perhaps a pro-feminist 
can participate in discourse. Consequently, my thoughts are not authoritarian accusations of 
wrong and right; they are an attempt to continue dialogue, to ask appropriate questions, to 
petition for critical self reflection and, therefore, to sustain the dynamic quest of continually 
opening up new emancipatory horizons and for actually beginning to transform the nature of 
social interaction. The paper rejects dogma and pursues engaged and committed discourse. 
